Achilles Shield brings Greece, Cyprus and Israel closer on defence

World cyprusDefenceGreeceIsraelTop News Achilles Shield brings Greece, Cyprus and Israel closer on defence Puls 2 1024x661 Relevant News Achilles Shield brings Greece, Cyprus and Israel closer on defence 26 July 2026 Iliana Papangeli: Independent journalism is a precondition for a functioning democracy 26 July 2026 Vehicle mows down crowd at Berlin Pride festival, killing one 26 July 2026 Kostis Konstantinou 26 July 2026 FacebookXWhatsAppEmailPrintViber The approval of the Achilles Shield by Greece’s Government Council for National Security, known as KYSEA, is more than another Greek defence purchase. It shows that the defence relationship between Greece, Cyprus and Israel is moving beyond exercises and declarations towards a shared, though not unified, operational environment. Proportionally, Greece and Cyprus stand to gain the most. Worth up to €3.5 billion, the Achilles Shield is not a giant Iron Dome. It is a network designed to connect new and existing assets, including Patriot systems, fighter jets, Greek Navy vessels and sensors operated by all three branches of the armed forces. At its core are David’s Sling, Barak MX and Spyder systems, together with ELM-2084 radars. David’s Sling is intended to counter the most challenging ballistic missile and other missile threats; Barak MX will cover the middle tier, while Spyder is designed for low-flying targets, drones and cruise missiles. Officials in Athens insist that the system will be fully operational within 35 months. Greece will produce 25% of the project, representing industrial work worth around €700 million. This will include a Greek-built command-and-control system, involvement in the production of missile canisters and components, and access to the source code. That may prove more important than the number of launchers. Israel has repeatedly sought to explain why, and a source in the country’s defence sector made the same point to us yesterday. Without control of the software, a state merely buys weapons, the source said. By gaining control of the software, it secures access, develops technical expertise and begins building defence autonomy. Israel already has military superiority, combat experience and a world-class defence industry. In return, it gains a safer route westwards, training areas and two stable partners in the eastern Mediterranean. For Athens and Nicosia, however, the benefits are greater: access to combat-tested technology, doctrines for countering missiles and drones and, above all, a partner that views Turkey as a regional power with competing ambitions. From joint exercises to a shared operating language The trilateral defence cooperation plan for 2026 provides for more intensive air and naval exercises, special forces training and the transfer of Israeli expertise on conventional and asymmetric threats. This is significant for the Cyprus National Guard. A small military cannot independently simulate a modern war involving ballistic missiles, loitering munitions, electronic jamming and saturation attacks. It can, however, train with an army capable of recreating such conditions and which already faces these threats. Cyprus has already taken delivery of the Israeli Barak MX, a modular system that can cover different altitudes and ranges depending on the missile used, and can counter aircraft, drones and missiles. Its selection also marks a move away from dependence on Russian systems, which have become more difficult to support since the invasion of Ukraine, both practically and politically. Barak MX is now also being placed at the heart of Greece’s Achilles Shield. This does not mean that Cyprus’s air defences have automatically been linked to Greece’s or that an invisible common shield now exists. It does, however, create a shared operating language: similar training, easier technical support, greater compatibility and the ability to exchange operational information and warnings. This matters even more for Cyprus. Its geography means it cannot compete with Turkey in numbers, nor is that Nicosia’s intention. Cyprus is clearly investing in defence, seeking to make a surprise attack more difficult, keep its command centres and airfields functioning and raise the cost of any aggressive action until outside support can be activated. The crisis last March offered a small indication of how this could work. When the regional conflict reached Cyprus, Greece sent four F-16 Viper fighter jets and two warships, one of which carried the Centaur anti-drone system. Turkey responded by deploying six F-16s and air defence systems in the occupied north. Within days, the island had become a forward operating theatre. The theory had been tested in practice. In the past, burying our heads in the sand reassured many people who were entirely detached from reality, encouraging the comforting illusion that we would never reach that point and that all we had — and were able — to do was keep quiet so Ankara would leave us alone. Today, such a position is not merely naive. It is far worse than that. The Greek ‘brain’ The Achilles Shield is not an isolated project, still less a move disconnected from Greece’s other purchases, which are all heading in the same direction. Rafale jets, F-16 Vipers and, later, F-35s provide the fighter component. FDI frigates, Israeli PULS rocket systems, Heron and V-BAT drones, synthetic aperture radar satellites, VICTA underwater vehicles and electromagnetic anti-drone systems add sensors, precision-strike capabilities, surveillance and cheaper responses to low-cost threats. The change does not lie in each platform separately. The aim is for all of them to see the same operational picture and serve the same detection-and-engagement chain. This also benefits Cyprus indirectly. A Greece that can better protect its bases and infrastructure does not have to keep fighter jets constantly tied up on alert missions and can see early what is moving from the Aegean to the eastern Mediterranean, and has a significantly greater ability to reinforce the Republic of Cyprus. The C-390 aircraft also provide faster strategic transport and air-to-air refuelling. They do not bring Cyprus geographically closer to Greece, but they shorten the operational distance. Turkey’s response Publicly, Ankara denounces its “encirclement” and presents the Republic of Cyprus’s purchases as upsetting the regional balance. When media reports said that Barak MX had been delivered, the Turkish Defence Ministry went so far as to warn of “dangerous consequences”. The hypocrisy is clear: the country speaking about a fragile balance maintains more than 35,000 occupying troops on an island the size of Cyprus. Its response on the ground is more substantial. Lefkoniko has been used as a base for Turkish unmanned aircraft since 2019, when Cyprus had not acquired such a system. The base provides surveillance over Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean. Ankara has periodically announced plans for a naval base, while it is upgrading existing port infrastructure to accommodate heavier warships. The deployment of six F-16s in March, even during an emergency, demonstrated that Turkey can rapidly turn the occupied north into a forward airbase. Air defence systems, drone centres and electronic warfare assets dramatically reduce the warning time available to the National Guard. As is often noted, Turkey continues to enjoy the advantage of mass and strategic depth. It has a large F-16 fleet, early-warning and air-to-air refuelling aircraft, a powerful navy, submarines and missile systems, as well as an industry that produces drones, ammunition and warships on a scale that Greece and Cyprus cannot match. At the same time, it is seeking to close the qualitative gap. Turkey has agreed to buy 20 new Eurofighters, is seeking another 24 used aircraft from Qatar and Oman and is expecting 40 new F-16 Block 70 jets. It also plans to modernise older aircraft using domestic technology. The KAAN has flown, but it remains a development programme rather than an operational fighter jet. Turkey’s insistence on obtaining engines from the United States is directly linked to this issue. Its possible return to the F-35 programme continues to face obstacles from the S-400 missile system, US legislation and Israeli objections. In air defence, Ankara is investing an additional $24 billion in the Steel Dome, an ambitious domestic network of radars, missiles and command centres that will still take several years to complete. What really changes The balance of power is therefore not being overturned. That is not the objective. Turkey remains numerically stronger, while the occupied north gives it an advantage that no contract can erase: it is already inside Cyprus, whether or not we are willing to grasp the full extent of that reality. Greece, by contrast, is building qualitative superiority in critical areas, including sensors, networking, air defence, fighter jets and precision strikes. This could give it local superiority at a particular time and place, but not overall dominance. The defence source cited earlier said Cyprus does not need to win an arms race. It needs more mobile air defence systems, low-cost counter-drone capabilities, sufficient stocks of interceptor missiles, hardened and dispersed command centres and pre-agreed plans for Greek reinforcement. Above all, we were told, intelligence sharing with Greece and Israel must stop depending on individual crises and become a permanent mechanism. Conclusion The Achilles Shield is not impenetrable, and Israel has not signed an agreement committing it to fight for Greece or Cyprus. Believing otherwise would be a dangerous illusion. When we asked how the value of the cooperation could be summarised, the answer was clear. This defence arrangement, the source said, deprives Turkey of the certainty that it can militarily isolate Nicosia, catch Athens by surprise or act in the eastern Mediterranean without taking Israeli capabilities into account. The source added that deterrence does not require a country to be stronger everywhere. It requires convincing an opponent that its first move will be neither easy nor the last. That, the source concluded, is where the real value of the defence triangle with Israel lies for Cyprus and Greece. Subscribe to our Newsletter Latest News Iliana Papangeli: Independent journalism is a precondition for a functioning democracy Vehicle mows down crowd at Berlin Pride festival, killing one Mountain showers forecast before temperatures rise next week Guterres arrives in Cyprus for one last push on a settlement Reported Houthi attack on Saudi Aramco site renews Red Sea shipping concerns (videos) Suspects flee police in Larnaca and crash while loaded with drugs (photos) Cyprus private debt drops to a third of 2012 peak Follow en.philenews on Google News and be the first to know all the news about Cyprus and the world.