Politics Cyprus problemTop News Ankara’s regional power game weighs on Cyprus talks 2025 11 14 07 14 08 746596 Relevant News Is Christodoulides opening the door to ELAM? The shifting alliances shaping 2028 13 September 2026 Ankara’s regional power game weighs on Cyprus talks 13 September 2026 Temperatures to reach 37°C with isolated mountain rain possible 13 September 2026 Costas Venizelos 13 September 2026 FacebookXWhatsAppEmailPrintViber The geopolitical turmoil in the region is affecting the Cyprus problem, as the occupying power ties each of its moves to its broader strategic ambitions. At this stage, Ankara clearly believes that the bigger picture is about expanding its influence, with control as the ultimate objective. That is its overriding priority. And because Ankara believes its geopolitical standing has been upgraded, this now shapes its position across the board, including on Cyprus. At the same time, whether or not the Cyprus problem ranks high among its immediate priorities, the Turkish side continues to pursue policies expressed either directly by Ankara, through its representative in the occupied areas, or by both. Turkey uses the occupied areas as a base from which to advance its regional objectives, while steadily strengthening the status of the breakaway entity. It is systematically seeking to upgrade the occupation regime. The various moves made by Ankara’s representative in the north also make clear that the objective is to place that entity on an equal footing with the Republic of Cyprus. Tufan Erhurman has adopted this approach in the current Cyprus process, largely following the path taken by his predecessors. His reactions in recent days confirm that he is seeking an upgrade of the occupation regime — and wants the Republic of Cyprus to consent to it. He raises the demand and insists on it. Otherwise, he refuses to cooperate. That is why Erhurman reacts, becomes irritated and angry whenever the Republic of Cyprus intervenes and blocks moves by the Turkish side. He wants to advance his objectives unhindered, with Nicosia’s acquiescence. What he raised at the meeting During his latest meeting with President Nikos Christodoulides, Ankara’s representative appeared annoyed and far from cooperative, according to Hasan Hasturer, writing in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper Kıbrıs. The Turkish Cypriot leader spoke of attacks “against the Turkish Cypriot people under Christodoulides’ auspices”. He cited several examples: – What he described as the omission of “what Turkish Cypriots experienced” from discussions at the European Parliament on missing persons and war crimes. – The cancellation of musical events following pressure. – Moves to prevent a Barcelona football programme for children from being held in the north. – Attempts to render the Immovable Property Commission ineffective. – Efforts to obstruct contacts between negotiator Mehmet Dana and foreign diplomatic representatives. Erhurman was reported to have asked: “Which of these builds trust? Which brings the two communities closer together?” He also asked: “How can we build a common future when we turn even children’s participation in sport into a political battleground?” Christodoulides’ response was the expected one. He pointed to the opportunities offered by statehood — in other words, by the Republic of Cyprus. All of the points raised by Ankara’s representative, of course, have a propaganda dimension. Erhurman speaks of an “erosion of trust”, yet he does not even respond to messages from the president. After the deadly shipwreck, Christodoulides immediately offered assistance with rescue efforts for those who had been aboard the vessel. Erhurman did not respond directly and rejected the offer. It should also be noted that Ankara’s representative avoids responding to approaches from other political party leaders in the government-controlled areas. This largely defines his attitude towards the Greek Cypriot side and Greek Cypriots more broadly. Running down the clock At the same time, the Turkish Cypriot leader has clearly adopted a tactic of running down the clock, putting forward various excuses and raising issues that do not concern the substance of the Cyprus problem. It is clear that he has not received the green light from Ankara to begin substantive discussions. That does not mean he does not believe the positions he expresses himself. What is clear is that the Turkish side has decided it does not want the latest effort on Cyprus — the final one for the outgoing UN secretary-general — to move forward. Turkey is keeping its distance from the Cyprus process because, quite plainly, it does not favour developments at this stage. It does not believe it has an “incentive” to make a move, or even to enter into talks. Ankara has always incorporated the Cyprus issue into its wider geopolitical objectives and planning, and appears to believe that the absence of a settlement does not harm its interests. Nor, it seems, does the unresolved Cyprus problem disrupt the plans of other major players active in the region. That environment works against both the Cyprus problem and Cyprus itself. This approach inevitably affects the process now under way and has been apparent during the meetings between Christodoulides and Erhurman. The latter is operating with one fact firmly in mind: Ankara has given him no signal to move even one step on Cyprus. As a result, he is running down the clock. But he is doing more than delaying. His tactics are also putting the next step in the Cyprus process at risk: the convening of an informal five-party conference, which is far from guaranteed. During his visit to Cyprus at the end of July, the UN secretary-general made clear that he would not convene such a meeting unless the conditions for success were in place. The Turkish side’s stance therefore narrows the prospects of such a gathering taking place. Nor can a meeting in New York later this month between the secretary-general, President Christodoulides and Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhurman be taken for granted, even though the UN chief intends to invite them. Ankara strengthens the administration in the north, worrying Erhurman On the domestic political front in the occupied areas, Ankara makes no secret of its support for Unal Ustel’s administration against the opposition Republican Turkish Party. That is why, during the recent visit to Ankara by the breakaway entity’s so-called prime minister, Unal Ustel, internal political developments and the next so-called elections were also discussed. The shipwreck was the reason for his visit, but Ustel also appears to have discussed these political issues, with the two sides coordinating their next moves. Ankara’s efforts to strengthen the administration are causing concern for Erhurman, who is in turn trying to reinforce his own channels of communication with the Turkish capital. Ankara’s covert campaign against Nicosia A response to Cyprus’s regional initiatives Ankara is systematically seeking to undermine Nicosia’s moves and initiatives across the wider region. Turkish mechanisms have shifted into an aggressive posture and, through a covert campaign, are attempting to undermine Cyprus’s initiatives and its efforts to deepen relations with countries in the region. Ankara repeatedly positions itself against Nicosia — against its plans, its initiatives and virtually every step it takes. This tactic has intensified recently, partly because Nicosia itself has become more active and partly because Ankara’s behaviour is shaped by wider geopolitical developments. Despite the pressure placed on countries including Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan, however, these states have not changed their approach towards the Republic of Cyprus, which they see as their own gateway to the European Union and as a state they can trust. Ankara is clearly irritated by the Cypriot side’s initiatives and makes little effort to hide it. That is why it is increasing pressure on neighbouring states, seeking closer relations with them while encouraging them to distance themselves from Nicosia. Egypt is a case in point. Efforts to repair ties with Ankara have led to agreements extending even into defence procurement. Yet Cairo continues to maintain a degree of distance because it does not trust Erdogan. It is well aware of his ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, with which the Ankara government maintains close relations. More recently, Ankara has been putting pressure on Jordan, raising security as a central issue and promoting the narrative that Turkey can assist the country and even act as its protector. A similar approach applies to Lebanon, even as Ankara undermines Beirut through a series of actions. It is focusing particularly on Lebanon’s Turkmen population and Sunni communities. At the same time, Ankara wants to operate as a centre of “soft power”, expanding its influence through economic, religious and cultural penetration. Across our region, as well as in Africa, the Balkans and the Caucasus, Turkey uses the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, TIKA, as one of the tools of this policy, funding social and religious projects. All of this forms part of Turkey’s broader strategy. Ankara, however, believes that Nicosia’s initiatives and the agreements Cyprus signs are restricting its own ambitions, including those associated with the “Blue Homeland” doctrine. What happened to the Mecca defence agreement? The much-publicised Mecca defence agreement between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan has so far failed to demonstrate the importance attributed to it. Saudi Arabia’s confrontation with the Houthis did not activate any mechanism under the Mecca agreement. Saudi Arabia was left on its own. The latest developments, with the Houthis taking the strategically important port city of Mocha and advancing towards Bab el-Mandeb, are creating a chain of consequences. These developments must also be considered alongside the disruption affecting navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Bab el-Mandeb links the Gulf of Aden with the Red Sea and, through the Suez Canal, connects Asia with the Mediterranean and Europe. Subscribe to our Newsletter Latest News Is Christodoulides opening the door to ELAM? 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