‘Constructive ambiguity’ in Cyprus talks another term for ‘fudge’

On the advice of UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres, the leaders of Cyprus’ two main communities are getting ready for talks in Cyprus, hoping to find enough common ground to move the process to the grander 5+1 platform. This would bring in the UK, Greece and Turkey, the latter two being the ‘kinship’ guarantor countries with which the respective communities share longstanding historical, cultural, linguistic, ancestral and religious ties. The UK is the third guarantor country and the United Nations the +1. So, if and when the new 5+1 eventually meets, Nikos Christodoulides will sit on one side of the negotiating table with the Greek mainland representative and Tufan Erhurman on the other with the Turkish mainland representative, with the UN secretary-general sitting symbolically in the middle. So, even before the meeting starts, Cypriotism is out of the window. The battle lines remain rooted in the adversarial Greek-versus-Turk philosophy that has shaped eastern Mediterranean politics for centuries. That we have failed to move on is stupefying, but we can only start from where we are. The Geneva and New York meetings in 2025 produced embarrassingly modest progress, mainly confidence-building measures and discussions around crossing points. The latter remain unresolved and even further demining is now disputed. So it is hardly surprising that the UNSG wants progress before convening another enlarged meeting. I think Erhurman is right to localise the talks by discussing issues first with his opposite number in Cyprus, hopefully finding elusive common ground in a more relaxed atmosphere. The odds of agreement on past points of contention may be worse than ever. There has been a federalist shift to the left in the north, while Turkey still backs a two-state solution. Erhurman supports a federal solution but he has notably avoided the word “federation”, perhaps reflecting that discomfort. In the south, meanwhile, the right-wing Elam substantially increased its strength and influence at the 2026 parliamentary election and President Christodoulides has spoken warmly of Eoka’s struggle for Enosis, a notion still deeply objectionable to Turkish Cypriots. Against this difficult backdrop, Politis and later The Independent reported ideas said to be under consideration around Maria Holguin, the UN secretary-general’s representative for Cyprus. They envisaged maximum internal self-government, a small common state, substantial territorial concessions to the Greek Cypriot side, Turkish Cypriot political equality in common institutions and an international/Nato security arrangement replacing the current guarantees. This is interesting, but no matter how the major Cyprus issues are presented, they boil down to five big questions: who governs, who keeps everyone safe, who lives where, who owns what, and what happens when the UN requirements of bizonal, bicommunal federation (BBF) collide with mainstream EU legislation. While Turkish Cypriots see political equality as effective participation and protection against majority rule, many Greek Cypriots see positive votes and similar safeguards as disproportionate minority power. Both support ‘political equality’, but not necessarily for the same thing. The reports referred to above described a loose federal model with perhaps five or six common ministries, “flexible enough for Greek Cypriots to call it federation and Turkish Cypriots something closer to confederation”. The Independentcalled this “constructive ambiguity”. I would call it closer to “disingenuous fudge”. It clearly intends to deceive. Why not be transparent with both communities so they can work out what it is for themselves? Then there is security. Greek Cypriots want Turkish intervention rights and troops removed. Turkish Cypriots regard Turkey’s guarantee as protection against any repetition of the insecurity and exclusion experienced after 1963. Both want security, but fundamentally disagree about what provides it. The reported Nato presence including Turkish, Greek, British, French and American troops is a non-starter because it puts power in the hands of the USA, and what they do in the Middle East hinges on the will of the extremist government of Israel. This poses high risks for both communities. Property may be the greatest practical minefield. Around 162,000 Greek Cypriots and 55,000 Turkish Cypriots were displaced, leaving tens of thousands of claims over property occupied, developed or sold over half a century. “Restitution, compensation and exchange” sounds simple, but resolving claims property by property could take decades and create conflict between returnees and residents in both communities. A comprehensive land swap arrangement would significantly reduce risks and strengthen bizonality, but this has not yet been put on the table as an option. Bizonality, an explicit UN Security Council requirement since 1990, is central to Turkish Cypriot communal identity, territorial security, self-government and protection from majority rule within one federal state. But what makes the northern constituent state genuinely Turkish Cypriot: population, property, political control, language, or all four? And how is that character preserved permanently? This leads directly to EU law. I have written previously about the difficulty of reconciling BBF with EU freedoms of movement, settlement, property and establishment. If those freedoms eventually become unrestricted and there are more non-Turkish Cypriots living in the northern constituent state than the Turkish Cypriots themselves, that clearly spells the end of bizonality and bicommunality and makes a nonsense of the constitution. The final version of the Annan Plan downgraded permanent unconditional derogations to temporary conditional restrictions with safeguards to protect a two-thirds Turkish language mother-tongue ratio among Turkish Cypriot residents. The administration of this is problematic especially given that Cyprus today includes naturalised citizens, mixed families, bilingual Cypriots and large immigrant populations. It is also open to legal non-discrimination challenges in the EU courts. At the Crans-Montana Cyprus summit in 2017, permanent derogations and EU primary-law protection issues were still unresolved. None of this proves federation cannot work. It just shows that its meaning still needs defining. Property affects population movement, population movement affects bizonality, bizonality affects EU freedoms, political equality affects government, and failure in any of them affects security and potential for conflict. I call on decision-makers to be brave and tell us what is happening behind closed doors. Call the unresolved gaps in negotiations “constructive ambiguity”, or simply “fudge”, but let us know where the fudge is before it leaves a bitter taste in all our mouths.