Could Cyprus become a flashpoint between Israel and Turkey?

World GreeceiranIsraelturkeywar Could Cyprus become a flashpoint between Israel and Turkey? Yanarocak Relevant News Could Cyprus become a flashpoint between Israel and Turkey? 8 September 2026 Cyprus records one of its rainiest summers in decades in 2026 8 September 2026 US business group calls for review of new tax law’s impact on Cyprus investors 8 September 2026 Kostis Konstantinou 8 September 2026 FacebookXWhatsAppEmailPrintViber Few people in Israel can understand Turkey as intimately as Dr Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak. Born and raised in Turkey’s Jewish community, he studied in Istanbul before moving to Israel and specialising in Turkish foreign policy and Ankara’s relationship with Jerusalem.We spoke on the day Greece and Israel signed their landmark defense agreement — an ideal starting point for a wider discussion about the rapidly changing strategic balance in the Eastern Mediterranean. The €3.035 billion agreement for the “Achilles Shield” is more than another major arms purchase. In the Israeli analyst’s assessment, it gives Greece substantially enhanced defensive capabilities, introduces combat-proven Israeli technology into the country’s security architecture and alters the regional balance. “First, we should underline that Israel’s air-defence systems are the most advanced and among the most frequently used and tested in the world,” Dr Yanarocak tells Phileleftheros. “They have proved themselves across different ranges, against different enemies and different technologies. When the Iranian regime launched drones against Israel, these systems achieved a success rate of more than 95 percent. That is remarkable.” The same defensive network, the expert on modern Turkey notes, has protected Israel against ballistic missiles, short- and medium-range missiles and rocket attacks. “It will provide similar protection to the Greek people should the need ever arise.” At the heart of the agreement are David’s Sling, Barak MX and SPYDER, together with radar systems and a national command-and-control centre designed to connect them within a single network. It is the first time Israel has undertaken to supply another country with an integrated, multilayered national air-defence system. How the system works Each layer of the new architecture is intended to counter a different category of threat. David’s Sling is designed to intercept ballistic missiles and heavy long-range rockets, Barak MX addresses missiles and aircraft at medium ranges, while the mobile SPYDER system is intended for lower-altitude and shorter-range targets, including unmanned aircraft. The critical innovation lies in their integration. Radars will feed information into a common command center, which will detect and assess each threat before assigning it to the most appropriate interceptor. Greece is therefore acquiring more than three separate systems: it is building a unified national defensive umbrella. The programme’s structure helps explain why the Israeli expert describes the arrival of Israeli technology in Greece as a “game changer”. In his analysis, its importance lies not in providing Greece with an offensive capability, but in strengthening its ability to defend itself against an increasingly broad spectrum of aerial threats. The programme also provides for significant participation by the Greek defense industry, allowing Greece to acquire not only the hardware but also the expertise required to operate, support and develop the system in the future. A new landscape of alliances Dr Yanarocak places the agreement within the broader emergence of new regional alignments. He points to the Mecca defense agreement involving Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which, according to reports in the Turkish press, other countries are also considering joining. “Within this new reality, the strategic partnership between Israel and Greece — and Cyprus must certainly be included in that equation — becomes even more important,” he says. “When we look at the bigger picture, we can see that these are not the only three countries that belong in the same strategic framework. I believe that the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and India can also be placed within the same parenthesis, even if no such alliance has been openly declared.” For the specialist in Turkish foreign policy, therefore, the Achilles Shield cannot be viewed solely as a bilateral arms agreement. He sees it as one component of a wider strategic realignment extending from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Gulf and India. Why is Ankara alarmed? The Achilles Shield is a strictly defensive system. Ankara nevertheless portrays it as a development directed against Turkey. Dr Yanarocak believes the Turkish reaction reflects concern about the system’s effect on the balance of power. “The unease in Ankara is caused by the fact that advanced Israeli technology is entering the equation as a game changer,” he says. “It strengthens Greece’s position in an unprecedented way, and I believe that is why we are seeing this anger.” His distinction is clear: the technology is not intended for offensive purposes. Its strategic importance, in the Israeli analyst’s view, comes from the degree to which it strengthens Greece’s defensive position. The Turkey expert also rejects the interpretation that the agreement represents a deliberate Israeli decision to seek confrontation with Ankara. He argues instead that Turkey’s own policies pushed Israel towards deeper cooperation with Greece and Cyprus. Former allies “The Turks brought this upon themselves when they adopted a highly antagonistic foreign policy towards the State of Israel and transformed their pro-Palestinian foreign policy into a pro-Hamas foreign policy,” he says. “In the past, Israel was very careful not to anger Turkey. Through their own actions, however, the Turks removed those constraints from the Israeli side. Israel now sees no reason to restrict its partnership with Greece and Cyprus while the Turkish side is deliberately worsening the relationship.” To explain the scale of the reversal, the Tel Aviv University researcher recalls that Israel and Turkey conducted joint military exercises during the 1990s and were widely regarded as allies. At the time, Greece maintained a more critical stance towards Israel. In his account, Jerusalem did not initiate the subsequent transformation of regional relationships. It was the consequence of Turkish policy and the effect that Ankara’s decisions had on Israeli decision-makers. “That is why I used the phrase that Turkey pushed Israel into the arms of Greece,” he explains. “I did not mean it negatively. On the contrary, Israeli decision-makers in Jerusalem are very pleased to deepen relations with Athens. Personally, I strongly support the alliance between Israel, Greece and Cyprus.” Turkey as a “frenemy” Asked whether Turkey should now be considered an enemy state, the Turkey-born Israeli specialist avoids a simplistic answer. He describes a relationship in which the formal definition and the political reality no longer correspond. “On paper, Turkey should still be considered a friendly state,” he says. “Unfortunately, however, its behavior towards Israel cannot be described as friendly.” That contradiction, he explains, has led a number of Israeli analysts to describe Turkey as a “frenemy” — a combination of “friend” and “enemy”. Despite the severity of the crisis, Dr Yanarocak insists that the two countries must not cross the threshold into declared hostility. “Such a development would be catastrophic for both Turkey and Israel,” he says. “Diplomatic channels should remain open, and the two countries should try to mend their fences as much as they can.” His call for dialogue does not amount to an optimistic assessment of the relationship. On the contrary, the Israeli researcher regards repairing it as close to “mission impossible” because of what he describes as the Turkish leadership’s “systematic campaign to delegitimise the State of Israel”. Nevertheless, he argues that the absence of declared hostilities still leaves room for diplomacy and for preventing Turkey from becoming another formal enemy of Israel. “As long as hostilities have not been declared, there is still light at the end of the tunnel,” he says. “Israel already has enough enemies. From an Israeli perspective, we are not interested in adding Turkey to that list. That would be a strategic mistake — not only for Israel, but for the entire region.” The message delivered in Syria The expert on Turkish-Israeli relations interprets the recent Israeli air strike in northwestern Syria within the same framework: as an attempt to prevent a future Israeli-Turkish confrontation rather than provoke one. He stresses that his assessment is based on reports in the Israeli press and other open sources. According to those reports, Jerusalem had conveyed a clear message that it would not welcome the deployment of Turkish forces close to Israel’s borders. The Turkish side, he says, appeared to disregard that warning. “According to the Israeli press and open sources, the Israeli Air Force carried out a surgical operation before the Turkish forces arrived,” he says. “No casualties were reported, which is a positive outcome, but the operation also delivered a very clear message to Ankara.” In the Israeli analyst’s reading, the timing and limited nature of the strike were designed to stop Turkish military infrastructure from being established in an area Israel considers strategically sensitive. “Israel spoke in the language of the Middle East because that was what the circumstances required,” he says. “The purpose of the strike was to keep Turkey away from Israel’s borders and prevent a future confrontation.” “This partnership is not only about weapons” Dr Yanarocak also rejects the claim that the trilateral relationship between Israel, Greece and Cyprus is merely transactional — a partnership based principally on arms sales and military exercises. “I strongly disagree with that view,” he says. “Greece, Cyprus and Israel share the same Judeo-Christian values, and all three are democratic states. There is also extremely important contact between their societies.” The regional-affairs expert points to the movement of people between the three countries as an important foundation of the relationship. Greece is one of the leading destinations for Israeli travellers, while Cyprus holds particular significance because of its proximity to Israel. For the Tel Aviv University researcher, however, the strength of the relationship became most apparent during a moment of crisis. “During the most recent war, Greece and Cyprus proved their friendship,” he says. “Israeli aircraft were hosted in Athens, while Israelis stranded abroad used Athens and Larnaca as important hubs through which they could return to Israel. From an Israeli perspective, these gestures will never be forgotten.” His assessment is therefore that the trilateral partnership has social and political foundations extending beyond military procurement. He views the assistance offered during the war as evidence that the relationship can also function in practice when Israel faces a crisis. War in Cyprus? The Israeli expert is unequivocal when asked about speculation that Cyprus, or the waters surrounding it, could become the scene of a military confrontation between Israel and Turkey. “I want to underline this very clearly: from an Israeli perspective, any military confrontation with Turkey is unwanted,” he says. “Jerusalem does not want to become involved in such a confrontation.” He does not dismiss the friction in the Eastern Mediterranean or Turkey’s substantial naval presence in the region. He argues, however, that these realities do not demonstrate that either Cyprus or another regional arena is destined to become the site of an Israeli-Turkish war. In his view, conspiracy theorists repeatedly identify different possible theatres for such a clash, depending on the map they are examining: Cyprus, Syria, the Red Sea or even the Horn of Africa. The Turkey specialist distinguishes between potential points of friction and an Israeli political or military intention to initiate conflict. Although he acknowledges the Turkish naval presence and the tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, he sees no current strategic logic that would lead Israel to begin a war with Turkey in or around Cyprus. “Israel is not going to initiate such a dangerous adventure,” he says. “Why would it do so? From an Israeli perspective, it would be meaningless unless a very concrete and tangible threat against Israel emerged from that region — something that is probably not the case today.” He therefore dismisses predictions of an Israeli-Turkish military confrontation in Cyprus as “baseless conspiracy theories”. Dr Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak is a researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University and at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. He also teaches at Tel Aviv University and is co-editor of Turkeyscope: Insights on Turkish Affairs. Subscribe to our Newsletter Latest News Cyprus records one of its rainiest summers in decades in 2026 US business group calls for review of new tax law’s impact on Cyprus investors Activists to rally against Israeli President Herzog’s Nicosia visit on Thursday Delivery rider attacked and robbed in Limassol Japan Embassy to screen Cannes-selected film Kokuho in Nicosia Marlon Jackson brings The Jacksons to Limassol in October The limousine and the supposedly classified letter Follow en.philenews on Google News and be the first to know all the news about Cyprus and the world.