Dionysis Tsirigotis: Turkey is expanding its geopolitical footprint, creating new realities for Cyprus

Politics Cyprus problemGreeceMiddle EastTop Newsturkey Dionysis Tsirigotis: Turkey is expanding its geopolitical footprint, creating new realities for Cyprus Saudi Arabia, Turkey And Pakistan Sign Joint Defence Deal In Mecca Relevant News Dionysis Tsirigotis: Turkey is expanding its geopolitical footprint, creating new realities for Cyprus 30 August 2026 Deadly summer storm leaves one dead, injuries and widespread damage across Cyprus 30 August 2026 Sunny weather ahead as temperatures set to rise above seasonal average 30 August 2026 Xenia Tourki 30 August 2026 FacebookXWhatsAppEmailPrintViber The security agreement between Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia adds another critical link to the geopolitical chain now taking shape from South Asia and the Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean. Without yet amounting to an institutionalised “Islamic NATO,” the Mecca Agreement marks the convergence of three powerful regional players seeking to strengthen their strategic autonomy and reduce their dependence on traditional external security guarantors. At the centre of this new reality is Turkey, says Dionysis Tsirigotis, Associate Professor of Modern Greek History, International Relations and Diplomacy at the Department of International and European Studies at the University of Piraeus, in an interview with Phileleftheros. He adds that Ankara is systematically broadening its political, military and economic footholds, without giving up the advantages its NATO membership offers. Turkey’s growing freedom of manoeuvre is creating new realities for Cyprus and Greece, he says, making it inadequate to expect that the European Union, the United States or the North Atlantic Alliance will act as a check on Turkey’s revisionist policy. At the same time, Turkish moves in the Aegean are adding a new, more complex dimension to the geopolitical standoff. The declaration of marine parks in areas of particular symbolic significance, and the possible legislative institutionalisation of the “Blue Homeland” doctrine, do not create international rights, the Greek professor argues. They could, however, serve the gradual administrative and operational entrenchment of Turkish claims, increasing pressure on Nicosia and Athens to respond with consistent legal, diplomatic and deterrent measures. Within this increasingly multipolar and competitive environment, Cyprus must turn its geographic position from a rhetorical advantage into genuine strategic utility. “The real danger does not lie in a change to international law, but in the institutional entrenchment and systematic implementation of a revisionist strategy. Nicosia and Athens must respond with consistent legal pushback, active exercise of their rights, diplomatic mobilisation and credible deterrence,” he stressed. How do you assess the Mecca Agreement between Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia? The Mecca Mutual Defence Agreement between Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia represents a notable development in the reshaping of the regional security architecture. It does not constitute, at least for now, an institutionalised “Islamic NATO,” but it does go beyond a conventional military cooperation agreement, since the mutual assistance clause introduces a clear logic of collective deterrence and comes accompanied by political-military coordination, joint exercises and defence-industrial cooperation. The cooperation between the three states is not built around a shared threat perception, but is grounded in the convergence of individual strategic interests and complementary capabilities. Saudi Arabia is focused on Gulf security, Pakistan on balancing India, while Turkey seeks to strengthen its strategic autonomy and regional influence. It is, therefore, more a case of flexible strategic convergence than a classic balancing alliance against a shared threat. At the same time, the agreement is a characteristic expression of strategic hedging: the participants are not abandoning their existing security relationships with the United States, but are diversifying their strategic dependencies and broadening their alternative options. Yet this also raises the classic abandonment-entrapment dilemma: strengthening guarantees reduces the risk of abandonment, but increases the likelihood of becoming entangled in crises that primarily concern another partner. So it offers strategic benefits to all sides. Yes, the strategic complementarity is substantial. Turkey brings conventional military and defence-industrial strength, Saudi Arabia brings economic and energy weight, and Pakistan brings significant military capacity and nuclear capability. The latter, however, does not automatically translate into a shared nuclear umbrella. The real significance of the agreement will depend on the degree of institutionalisation, the convergence of threat perceptions, and genuine willingness to bear costs in a crisis. At the geopolitical level, the arrangement reflects a shift towards a more multipolar regional order, in which middle powers are seeking greater autonomy, multiple partnerships and reduced dependence on exclusive external guarantors. It is, therefore, a mechanism of strategic diversification whose cohesion remains, empirically, to be tested in the years ahead. What does the expansion of Turkey’s geopolitical presence mean for Greece and Cyprus? The expansion of Turkey’s geopolitical presence substantially alters the strategic environment for the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, since it strengthens Ankara’s strategic depth, autonomy and freedom of manoeuvre. Turkey is not pursuing a linear shift from “West” to “East.” Instead, it is applying a multidimensional strategy, seeking to retain the advantages of NATO membership while simultaneously developing parallel networks of political, economic, military and defence-industrial cooperation stretching from the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean to the Middle East, Africa and South Asia. This strategy can be understood as strategic hedging and a pursuit of strategic autonomy. Ankara is diversifying its international dependencies, increasing its alternative options and, in turn, its bargaining power with both Western and regional partners. For Greece and Cyprus, this development renders inadequate any strategy that relies solely on the expectation that NATO, the European Union or the United States will automatically act as mechanisms to contain Turkey’s revisionist policy. What is needed, therefore, is a combination of internal balancing, through strengthening defence, technological and deterrent capabilities, and external balancing, through stable and institutionalised regional partnerships. The “Blue Homeland” doctrine takes on particular importance in this context. It is not limited to a set of cartographic claims, but constitutes a broader conception of Turkey’s maritime orientation and geopolitical positioning. The expansion of Ankara’s international footholds does not, of course, legitimise its unilateral maritime claims; but it does strengthen the political, economic, technological and military capacity with which it can support them. For Athens and Nicosia, therefore, the critical task is to build long-term strategic deterrence and resilience, capable of addressing not only potential crises but also the gradual shift in the regional balance of power. How should Egypt’s non-participation be interpreted? There is not, as yet, sufficient evidence to state as fact that Egypt rejected the Mecca Agreement. On the contrary, Turkey has publicly referred to Egypt as a possible future member, while Cairo already takes part, alongside Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, in broader forms of political coordination. The more scientifically accurate term, then, is non-accession at this stage. In that sense, Egypt’s position can be read as a form of strategic autonomy. Cairo has an interest in normalising relations with Ankara, but not necessarily in taking on collective defence obligations within a system where threat perceptions diverge significantly. At the same time, it maintains strategic relations with Greece and Cyprus and has already built its own web of interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its absence limits the geographic coherence of the new agreement. Egyptian accession, should it happen, would institutionally link the Gulf with the Red Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, and would substantially increase the Arab weight of the arrangement. That is why Egypt’s future stance matters more than its current absence. As Ankara builds this new security arrangement, efforts continue to strengthen the 3+1 format. Are two competing blocs taking shape in the Eastern Mediterranean? It would be analytically misleading to speak of two solid, Cold War style blocs. What is emerging is more of a networked security architecture, in which states take part in overlapping partnerships without exclusivity. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever’s Regional Security Complex Theory is particularly useful here: a state’s security is closely tied to the threats and choices of geographically proximate or functionally interconnected states. The Greece, Cyprus, Israel, US 3+1 format and the Mecca Agreement should not automatically be seen as rival military alliances. They are different types of nodes within a broader web. The trend, however, is clear: regional powers are trying to increase their autonomy, create additional guarantees, and strengthen their position ahead of future crises. What role could Cyprus play in the new security architecture? Within the emerging security architecture of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, the Republic of Cyprus could take on a role more significant than its demographic and military size would suggest. Its strategy cannot rest on trying to balance larger regional powers purely in terms of hard power. Instead, it must convert the comparative advantage of its geographic position into institutionally anchored strategic utility. This approach is grounded in small-state strategy theory, according to which limited material power can, under the right conditions, be offset through institutional integration, specialisation, diplomatic credibility, and the development of functions useful to stronger partners. Cyprus’s status as an EU member state, its geographic proximity to the Middle East, and its participation in regional cooperation frameworks all provide significant capital in this direction. In practice, Cyprus could establish itself as a regional hub for humanitarian operations and evacuations, maritime security, cybersecurity, civil protection, energy cooperation and the protection of critical infrastructure, including undersea cables and energy installations. The capacity to provide training, coordination and regional crisis management infrastructure also takes on particular significance here. This is, in essence, a strategy of institutional anchoring: the more the Republic of Cyprus becomes embedded in permanent European and regional security networks, and the more functionally useful it becomes to its partners, the more its own stability becomes tied to their interests. The task, therefore, is not simply to invoke Cyprus’s “geostrategic position,” but to convert geography into institutions, infrastructure and lasting strategic interdependencies. In this way, a small state can increase its diplomatic weight and indirectly strengthen its security and resilience within an increasingly competitive international environment. Nicosia and Athens must respond immediately Why has Turkey moved to declare two marine parks in the Northeastern Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, on islands of particular symbolic and geopolitical value, and how will this development affect Greek-Turkish relations? Here we need to strictly separate the environmental, jurisdictional and geopolitical levels. A marine park is not, by its nature, an act of sovereign expansion. Coastal states hold, within maritime zones where they have lawful jurisdiction, competences for protecting the marine environment and managing natural resources. The problem arises when the siting or application of protective measures concerns areas where maritime jurisdiction is disputed or has not been delimited. Articles 74 and 83 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea set out the fundamental principle that, between states with opposite or adjacent coasts, the delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf is achieved through agreement, and that, until such agreement is reached, states must not jeopardise or hinder the final agreement. In this context, Turkey’s choice of areas of high geopolitical symbolism in the Northeastern Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean creates precisely this problem. The move can be read as a form of administrative performativity: the state is attempting, through environmental administration, to put its own conception of jurisdiction into practice. What matters is that this administrative behaviour does not create an international title. It can, however, create a political and operational precedent if it goes unanswered. How can Athens respond without allowing a fait accompli to be created? The response must rest on three parallel levels: legal preservation of positions, effective exercise of lawful rights, and credible deterrence. Continuous and clear protest matters, because it forecloses any interpretation that Greece is tacitly accepting a unilateral practice. Legal protest alone, however, is not enough. A corresponding administrative presence is needed: scientific research, environmental management, lawful licensing, maritime spatial planning, and the exercise of the competences that genuinely derive from international law. The core legal point was already established by the International Court of Justice back in 1951: even when a delimitation or boundary is expressed through a unilateral internal act, its validity against third states “depends on international law.” This means precisely that Greece’s response does not need to challenge Turkey’s right to legislate within its own international jurisdiction; it must explicitly challenge any claim to apply such measures against Greece or Greek activities in areas where Turkey holds no relevant international title. You mentioned the “Blue Homeland” doctrine earlier. What would its legislative institutionalisation mean, and how would it affect Cyprus? Any potential legislative institutionalisation of the “Blue Homeland” doctrine requires a strict distinction between domestic law and the international legal order. Its incorporation into Turkish legislation could not, by itself, create or strengthen an international title of sovereignty, an EEZ, a continental shelf, or other sovereign rights against Greece or the Republic of Cyprus. The scope and delimitation of maritime rights are determined by international law and, where opposite or adjacent coasts exist, through agreement or another internationally recognised dispute resolution mechanism. The case law of the International Court of Justice confirms this fundamental principle. In the Fisheries Case (the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 18 December 1951), the Court noted that, even when an act of delimitation is expressed unilaterally, its opposability and validity against third states are judged on the basis of international law, not the internal will of the coastal state. The significance of such a legislative choice would, therefore, be primarily institutional, administrative and strategic. It could unify the actions of ministries, the armed forces, hydrographic services and energy bodies around a coherent map of claims, converting a strategic outlook into a more stable state policy. The repetition of claims, however, through maps, NAVTEX notices, licensing, surveys or operational presence does not produce international legitimacy, nor does it create rights against third parties. It can, however, pursue the cumulative administrative normalisation of a claim and increase the political cost of challenging it. Cyprus is directly affected, because Turkey’s maritime strategy treats the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean as an interconnected geopolitical space. The real danger, therefore, does not lie in a change to international law, but in the institutional entrenchment and systematic implementation of a revisionist strategy. Athens and Nicosia must respond with consistent legal pushback, active exercise of their rights, diplomatic mobilisation and credible deterrence. This is what prevents a unilateral claim from turning into a politically entrenched and operationally repeated practice in maritime space. Subscribe to our Newsletter Latest News Deadly summer storm leaves one dead, injuries and widespread damage across Cyprus Sunny weather ahead as temperatures set to rise above seasonal average Limassol businessman, rally driver Dimi Mavropoulos dies in boat disaster off Cape Greco One dead, five rescued in Cape Greco search and rescue operation Storm could push August rain past 700% of average, Kitasweather says Hundreds of weather-related incidents reported as storms batter Cyprus Two boats sink, third at risk off Cape Greco in rough seas; five rescued Follow en.philenews on Google News and be the first to know all the news about Cyprus and the world.