By Farhad Ibragimov – lecturer at the Faculty of Economics at RUDN University, expert and lecturer at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences and Mass Communications, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
By Farhad Ibragimov – lecturer at the Faculty of Economics at RUDN University, expert and lecturer at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences and Mass Communications, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
Iraq may gradually be turned into a platform for the US to exert pressure on Iran. This doesn’t mean that Baghdad will be directly involved in the conflict; rather, Iraq may be used as a political, intelligence, logistical, and border corridor as part of a broader anti-Iran strategy currently being developed by the US and Israel.
The latest events in Baghdad point to the likelihood of this scenario. In late June, Iraqi security forces blocked the entrances to the ‘Green Zone’ – a fortified area in Baghdad where key government institutions and foreign diplomatic missions are located – and carried out a series of raids. Several political figures were detained, some of whom, according to media reports, are associated with the bloc of former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani.
Officially, this is being presented as an anti-corruption campaign. But in Iraq – and generally, in the Middle East – anti-corruption cases are rarely just about corruption. Very often, they are driven by a power struggle, external influence, control over security forces, and an attempt to alter the balance within the elites.
Notably, this is happening after a shift in the political configuration of Iraq. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, a businessman and political newcomer, was presented as a compromise figure after a protracted crisis within the Coordination Framework (a council of major Shiite parties). His emergence on the political scene was the result of complex bargaining between domestic and foreign players.
Western and regional media directly reported that his candidacy was backed by Washington. Therefore, what is happening in Iraq may be viewed as more than just an internal fight against corruption. According to another theory, this may be an attempt to reform the Iraqi elite, weaken pro-Iranian groups, limit the influence of armed groups linked to Tehran, and make Baghdad more manageable in the event of renewed pressure on Iran.
Herein lies the main question: Is Iraq being prepared for war against Iran? Probably not. Iraq is viewed as a platform for pressuring Iran, not as an independent participant in the war. These are fundamentally different things. Iraqi territory may be used for intelligence operations, pressure, logistics, special operations, work with the Kurdish factor, and control over border areas. However, this does not mean that the US will decide to launch a full-scale ground invasion of Iran. Currently, this option appears too risky and costly.
Nevertheless, Iraq is a very sensitive direction for Tehran. Factors like the shared border, US infrastructure, the weakness of certain state institutions, the autonomous Kurdistan region, competition between the elites, and the presence of armed groups make Iraq a convenient space for applying hybrid pressure. Instead of a direct strike via the Persian Gulf, the US may employ a more gradual approach, for example, by creating new flashpoints around Iran without declaring a major war.
We may particularly note the incident that occurred last week near the city of Piranshahr in Iran’s West Azerbaijan Province. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced the elimination of five terrorists who infiltrated the country through the mountainous border regions to commit acts of sabotage.
Geography plays a key role in this matter. Piranshahr is located very close to the border with Iraq. Nearby is the Tamarchin Border Terminal, through which cargo flows from Iraq to Iran and further along regional routes. This is more than just a trading hub. It’s a sensitive area where border issues, logistics, the ethnical factor, and security issues converge.
This area is home to a large Kurdish population on both sides of the border. Moreover, in Iran’s West Azerbaijan Province, domestic and intercommunal tensions periodically arise between Iranian Kurds and Iranian Azerbaijanis, though Tehran tries not to draw public attention to this matter. These border areas are particularly attractive for external players: Here, it’s much easier to create tension, stage provocations, test the response of the security forces, and burden the state with additional problems.
In this situation, the Kurdish factor could become one of the key tools used against Iran. Firstly, it is a well-known fact that the Kurds are used by the US and Israel. Moreover, the border zone between Iran and Iraq has long been home to armed groups, historical contradictions, a complex ethnopolitical situation, and external influence. This is precisely why the clashes near Piranshahr cannot be viewed separately from the political processes in Baghdad. On the one hand, Iraq is witnessing a purge of political figures associated with previous pro-Iranian forces. On the other hand, the Kurdish border is becoming more active. Together, this creates a feeling that a network of pressure is being formed around Iran; Iraq, Kurdistan, the Persian Gulf, intelligence agencies, sanctions, infrastructure threats, and internal destabilization efforts are all part of it.
At the same time, a full-scale ground invasion of Iran remains unrealistic. Iran cannot be quickly suppressed by means of a ground invasion because of its vast territory, difficult terrain, powerful security apparatus, significant mobilization resources, missile potential, and a network of allied structures in the region. Any attempt to use Iraq as a staging ground for a direct invasion would almost inevitably lead to retaliatory strikes against US military facilities in Iraq, the energy infrastructure of the Gulf states, and the logistics of US allies.
That is why the Gulf monarchies, despite their ties to Washington, are unlikely to openly engage in a full-scale war against Iran. They may provide infrastructure, intelligence and logistics support, airspace, or political cover. But direct involvement comes with much greater risk. Tehran’s response could be painful, and would target the ports, oil facilities, air bases, financial centers, and transportation corridors of the Gulf states.
In other words, Iraq looks less like an independent participant in a future war and more like a convenient platform for pressuring Iran; it could be used for political reorientation, intelligence and logistics, work with the Kurdish forces and armed groups, and limited operations against Tehran.
This scenario appears more likely as of today. The US may hesitate to launch a full-scale ground war against Iran, but it could very well use Iraq as a territory for gradually weakening Iranian influence. The events in Baghdad and Piranshahr demonstrate that preparations for a new war against Iran are proceeding quietly and systematically.
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