By Ekaterina Serova, head of the Department of International Affairs, PORA Expert Centre (Moscow) and Bipandeep Sharma, associate fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (New Delhi)
Russian-Asian rapprochement in the Arctic is currently unfolding along two distinct tracks: the first driven by logistics and operations, and the second focused on resources and investment.
Russia’s new Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor (TATC), whose key section is the Northern Sea Route (NSR) running along its Arctic coast, is intended domestically to connect major Russian ports – from St. Petersburg through Murmansk to Vladivostok – and link them to inland cities and towns via land, rail, sea and inland waterway networks.
On the international front, the larger TATC is aimed at linking the consumer markets of Europe and Asia via shorter, safer, more cost-effective, and alternative maritime routes. Similarly, on the resource and investment side, Russia remains keenly interested in developing Arctic and Siberian potential in critical minerals, energy resources, and infrastructure projects that require capital and technology.
The overall Russian approach in the Arctic remains focused on linking its energy and mineral projects in mainland Russia, the Arctic, Siberia, and the Far East to the TATC through multimodal transport connectivity.
Last month marked a turning point for container transit along the NSR when Sea Legend Shipping launched its regular container service – the China-Europe Arctic Express – consisting of eight voyages, that are scheduled between August and early October 2026. The first shipment, which set sail from China’s Ningbo-Zhoushan port on August 15 via the Northern Sea Route, reached the Port of Teesport in the United Kingdom on September 9 – in just 25 days.
The goal is to deliver high-value and time-sensitive cargo including electronics, lithium batteries, electric vehicle components and photovoltaic modules to multiple European ports (Felixstowe, United Kingdom; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Hamburg, Germany and Gdynia, Poland). Sea Legend Shipping is making use of Russian ice breaking services, and is delivering good to its European clients in far less time than via traditional routes. So far it hasn't faced any kind of criticism or sanctions from Europe.
Similarly, South Korea’s PanStar Group has conducted its own pilot voyage along the NSR to European ports, carrying chemical products. South Korea’s Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries and Panstar reported on Monday that the containership Panstar Arco has completed the first leg of its demonstration voyage, reaching the UK and Rotterdam on September 12 and 13 respectively – successfully covering the route in 21 days. The vessel will then sail to Gdynia, Poland, where it is expected to load additional cargo before beginning the return trip. The vessel is currently scheduled to return to Busan on October 12.
While Seoul hopes this pilot test will position Busan as a leading Arctic shipping hub, currently there are no plans to move regular commercial traffic along the NSR until 2030.
Against this backdrop, India’s interest in the Russian Arctic is positioned quiet differently. It is primarily about integrating into the resource and investment aspect of the region. The economic viability of sending goods to Europe from India by transiting the entire NSR remains unfavorable for the foreseeable future, but it does offer a secure, strategic alternative maritime route to the traditional shipping lanes, given ongoing geopolitical challenges.
For India, in shipping terms, Russia’s proposed TATC offers greater potential if cargoes are picked up from, or delivered to, Vladivostok and then sent either to other points in Russia via the TATC’s multimodal transport network or to India through the Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC), also known as the Chennai-Vladivostok Maritime Corridor.
Similarly, some segments or shipping connectivity between India and Eastern ports of Russia along the NSR can become viable options for enhancing point-to-point shipping connectivity between both the countries, if Russia becomes successful in integrating those with its energy and mineral development projects in the region.
The India-Russia partnership dates back to the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. Despite contemporary global geopolitical challenges, the underlying character of India-Russia bilateral cooperation has remained intact.
On bilateral trade and economic fronts, it in fact has grown exponentially. Despite western pressures, India’s oil imports for Russia have continued and it has emerged as a significant factor in supporting the Russian economy in challenging times. In 2022, India’s oil imports from Russia surged to $45.9 billion and crossed $79 billion last year.
Russia’s Pivot to the Arctic and its planned large-scale projects in terms of shipping, energy, and mineral development need Indian industrial attention to take these trade figures between the countries to new highs in the future.
India’s projected demand for rare and critical metals is expected to increase four to tenfold by 2047. India is heavily dependent on imports of lithium, cobalt, nickel, and a number of other rare-earth elements. Furthermore, India’s net cumulative demand for minerals such as copper, graphite, silicon, and nickel is also expected to increase exponentially between 2025 and 2070. Russia’s resource base appears almost ideally complementary to such Indian needs.
The Pavlovskoye lead-zinc deposit in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago; the Tomtor deposits, which constitute one of the largest deposits of niobium and rare-earth elements in Yakutia; and the Angara-Yenisey cluster for the deep processing of non-ferrous and rare metals in Siberia are some of the potential projects that could fulfill India’s future mineral resource demands. Any significant progress in terms of joint investments and partnership could open new prospects for India-Russia economic partnership and reduce Indian reliance on traditional hegemons for these resources.
India’s demand for oil is expected to be around 14 million barrels per day by 2050, while its gas consumption is also expected to rise to 103 billion cubic meters annually by 2030. Of this, around 65 billion cubic meters would be supplied by India’s LNG imports.
Crude continues to remain the key commodity in the India-Russia trade basket, and Russia’s vast LNG potential, mainly its Arctic projects, remains largely untapped by India. LNG imports require specialized vessels, and longer distances add to its transportation costs, which ultimately affect its final price. New investments in Russian Arctic LNG projects could offer a strategic diversification and long-term solutions for meeting India’s energy demands in any future geopolitical scenarios in West Asia if both sides are successful in factoring in pricing and transportation aspects.
India, on the other hand, possesses substantial refining capabilities in terms of crude and its related derivatives while Russia is currently facing difficulties in meeting its own demand for refined petroleum products. This is opening another avenue for greater cooperation between the two sides. India has recently scaled up deliveries of refined petroleum products to Russia to meet its domestic needs.
In March this year, New Delhi allocated approximately $8.4 billion to bolster shipbuilding, shipbreaking, and maintenance infrastructure under the ‘Make in India’ initiative. Concurrently, Russia’s growing demand for vessel construction and maintenance presents high-value opportunities for Indian shipbuilding and ship-repair enterprises. Synergizing these capabilities directly aligns with both nations’ strategic interests, offering a mutually beneficial avenue for bilateral maritime cooperation. Both Russia and India are placing significant emphasis on developing sustainable maritime operations for the future.
Both countries are pursuing major reforms to build greener ports and cleaner maritime infrastructure, promote alternative fuels, deploy hybrid and electric vessels, and launch green shipping corridors. They are also focusing on advanced technologies and AI to modernize ports and improve logistics and cargo handling – creating strong potential for high-value economic cooperation between India and Russia.
In its efforts to advance its artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities, India has recently allocated about $1.25 billion to the IndiaAI mission. Similarly, India’s ‘Semicon India Programme’ aims to build a self-reliant semiconductor ecosystem in the country. Such initiatives create new avenues for collaboration in high-growth digital sectors between India and Russia.
Russia’s Arctic pivot to the East is the sum of several parallel experiments at different stages of maturity. Container shipping along the NSR remains niche, seasonal, and dependent on who ultimately assumes the commercial risks. Russia’s Atomflot tariff depends on a vessel’s gross tonnage, ice class, distance, and the period of escort. Added to this are the higher costs of icebreaker escorts, high insurance premiums for Arctic voyages, and the need for crews trained to operate in Arctic conditions. Despite these challenges, countries like China and South Korea are already sending test consignments to Europe via the NSR and are competing for the benefits of first movers.
Russia’s total foreign trade turnover reached $697.3 billion in 2025, of which 73.4% was accounted for by Asia. India contributed approximately $63.6 billion, and remains Russia’s second-largest trading partner after China, significantly ahead of the UAE, Brazil, Iran, and South Africa.
India has highlighted its plans to send its first cargo via the NSR by 2027, but its broader comprehensive plans for the region are still at the nascent stage of development. Opening up of the Russian Arctic offers immense new untapped business potential for India and Russia, requiring a stronger government push and greater Indian industrial exposure.
This would not only help India and Russia to reach their bilateral trade target of $100 billion by 2030, but to surpass it in the future.
The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.
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