Minas Lyristis: Cyprus’s NATO accession is not realistic today, but strategic convergence is achievable

World Cyprus problemNATOTop Newsturkey Minas Lyristis: Cyprus’s NATO accession is not realistic today, but strategic convergence is achievable Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan Relevant News Minas Lyristis: Cyprus’s NATO accession is not realistic today, but strategic convergence is achievable 5 July 2026 Minor 2.2 magnitude earthquake shakes Limassol district on Saturday afternoon 4 July 2026 Costa Brava wildfire destroys 2,200 hectares in northeastern Spain 4 July 2026 Xenia Tourki 5 July 2026 FacebookXWhatsAppEmailPrintViber The upcoming NATO summit takes place at one of the most unstable moments in recent decades, with the war in Ukraine still under way, the Middle East still in turmoil and relations between the United States and Europe under strain. The Alliance must show it can adapt to an environment in which military, economic, energy and technological challenges are now directly bound up with European and international security, Dr Minas Lyristis, a researcher at the Centre for the Analysis of Middle Eastern Policy (KEAMEP) and a junior scholar at Strategy International Think Tank, tells Phileleftheros. The analyst points out that the American president’s pressure for Europeans to shoulder more of the cost of defence has reignited the debate over the future of transatlantic relations, and over whether Europe can achieve genuine strategic autonomy. The decisions to be taken will concern not only higher defence spending but the Alliance’s real operational readiness against new threats. Considerable weight will also be placed on how European countries fill the gaps that for decades were almost automatically covered by American power, he explains. The role of Turkey is also of particular interest, as Ankara seeks to use its geopolitical position and its importance to NATO to strengthen its negotiating hand with the EU and its Western allies. At the same time, the debate over Turkey’s participation in European defence programmes is resurfacing, along with the balancing act facing Cyprus, which periodically eyes the possibility of strengthening its own ties with the Alliance. Dr Minas Lyristis What will be on the agenda for NATO leaders on July 7 and 8? Where do you expect disagreement, and where consensus? The Ankara summit will be primarily a summit of implementation, not declaration. After the decisions taken in The Hague, the central question is how allies will turn their commitments on defence spending, industrial base and readiness into actual capability. Discussions will cover Ukraine, the Russian threat, air defence, munitions production, critical infrastructure, cybersecurity and the NATO-EU relationship. Considerable weight will also fall on how European countries fill the gaps that, for decades, were almost automatically covered by American power. Here I mean the question of real military output: what is produced, in what timeframe, with what industrial base and what operational value. In my assessment, there will be consensus on the need to strengthen deterrence against Russia and on the recognition that European countries must take on a greater share of their own defence. The disagreements will be over pace, cost, burden-sharing and the extent to which each state is willing to fit collective needs into its own national planning. Agreeing politically with a goal is one thing; building it into national budgets, social tolerance and defence industries is another. The summit is taking place at a critical turning point in the Alliance’s history. How is it affected by the destabilisation of the international security system? NATO is returning to its core mission: deterrence and collective defence. In my view, the post-Cold War period, when the Alliance could function mainly as a crisis-management mechanism, has passed. Russia is actively challenging the European security order, China is shaping American strategic calculations, the Middle East remains a source of instability, and hybrid threats are blurring the line between peace and conflict. Today, security is no longer just about borders and armies, but energy, sea lanes, supply chains, technology, intelligence and political resilience. This destabilisation does not necessarily weaken NATO; it makes it necessary. At the same time, though, it exposes the Alliance to internal contradictions. As the threat grows, so does the need for cohesion. But as the cost of defence rises, national priorities assert themselves more sharply. The Alliance therefore has to prove it can be a mechanism for producing power. Its credibility, though, will not be judged by the wording of its communiqués, but by its members’ ability to sustain forces, replenish stockpiles and deter an opponent that calculates cost rather than intentions. Donald Trump has at times threatened to withdraw the US from the Alliance. Is that a realistic possibility, and what would a NATO without the US mean? A full US withdrawal from NATO remains institutionally and strategically difficult. But we shouldn’t confuse formal withdrawal with a functional weakening of American commitment. The real question isn’t only whether the US will remain a member of the Alliance, but under what terms it will continue to treat European security as an American strategic priority. A NATO without the US, or with a US less willing to lead, would be a different organisation. American power isn’t just about quantitative military contribution. It’s the nuclear umbrella, strategic transport, intelligence, command, surveillance, technological superiority and political credibility. It’s also the capacity for rapid escalation and the certainty that an adversary cannot easily test the Alliance’s limits. European countries can strengthen significantly, but they cannot immediately replace that whole set of capabilities. That’s why this debate shouldn’t be framed in terms of panic, but in terms of preparation. Two extremes need to be avoided: complacency because the US remains in NATO, and the illusion that institutional membership alone is enough for deterrence. The point is to make EU countries less vulnerable to external threats, not to create the artificial impression that American power is already replaceable. Does hosting the summit give Turkey a chance to upgrade its standing within NATO? If so, how, and what is Ankara actually trying to achieve? Hosting the summit is a tool of strategic projection for Turkey. Ankara doesn’t want to appear as a “problematic” ally, but as an indispensable one. It holds a very significant geographic position for the Black Sea, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Eastern Mediterranean. It also has substantial armed forces and a growing defence industry. Its aims, then, are threefold. First, to secure its role as an irreplaceable geopolitical hub. Second, to seek greater access to Western procurement, technology and industrial schemes. Third, to convert its importance to NATO into negotiating capital against the EU, the US, Greece and Cyprus. Turkey knows that in a more competitive international environment, geography regains its value. It is therefore seeking to sell its strategic usefulness in exchange for political and technological concessions. At the same time, it will try to limit the criticism it faces over its independent foreign policy by presenting its operational contribution as proof that it remains necessary to the Alliance. This doesn’t mean its allies accept all of Turkey’s positions; it means Ankara is trying to raise the cost of its partners sidelining it. According to reports, Recep Tayyip Erdogan is seeking to upgrade his country’s cooperation with Europe. Could Turkey ultimately take part in programmes such as SAFE or ReArm despite objections from Cyprus and Greece? Turkey will try to link its indispensability within NATO to its participation in European defence architecture. That’s entirely predictable. The question is whether the EU will accept Turkey as a defence partner without taking into account its relations with EU member states. Greece and Cyprus have serious institutional and political tools to set conditions. This isn’t a simple bilateral matter, after all, but a question of European order, sovereignty and credibility. Ankara will therefore pursue partial participation, technical arrangements or industrial partnerships. But full, unimpeded participation without respect for the interests of EU member states would be politically difficult and strategically contradictory. The EU cannot build defence autonomy while disregarding the security of its own member states. So for Ankara, the road to European defence necessarily runs through political conditions, not just industrial interests. If the EU bypasses the concerns of Nicosia and Athens, it will undermine the very logic of common European security. Cooperation can only happen, on the other hand, when it’s clear it isn’t being turned into a tool of pressure against member states. Many obstacles for Cyprus Here in Cyprus, the possibility of our joining NATO comes up periodically. Is that realistic? In theory, any European state that meets the criteria can seek NATO membership. In practice, Cyprus’s case is extremely complex. The unresolved Cyprus problem, the presence of Turkish occupation troops, Turkey’s non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, and NATO’s unanimity rule all create a very high political barrier. That doesn’t mean Cyprus should remain passive. On the contrary, it can deepen its cooperation with the EU, make use of defence tools such as SAFE or wider initiatives such as ReArm Europe, upgrade its interoperability with Western partners and strengthen its bilateral relations with countries such as the US, France, Greece and Israel. Full NATO membership isn’t realistically imminent today, but gradual strategic convergence with the Western security architecture is achievable. For Cyprus, the point isn’t to announce maximalist goals without the power to back them, but to methodically increase its value to its partners. That means infrastructure, ports, energy security, intelligence cooperation, defence training and a clear strategic identity. Deep rift in Euro-Atlantic relations To what extent does the crisis in relations between Trump and the Europeans threaten NATO’s cohesion and development? This crisis shouldn’t be read only as personal or a matter of communication style. It reflects a deeper shift in American priorities. The US believes European countries have, for many years, consumed security disproportionate to their contribution. Trump expresses that position sharply, but the debate over burden-sharing existed before him, and I expect it will continue after him too. NATO’s cohesion is threatened when deterrence stops being taken for granted. Adversaries are watching not just military capability, but political will. So the biggest challenge for the Alliance is to prove that its internal disagreements don’t cancel out its external credibility. If NATO’s European member states appear unwilling to invest in their own security, it will strengthen the arguments of those in Washington who question the value of European commitments. Cohesion, after all, is a function of shared threat, shared resources and a shared understanding of the cost of inaction. Do you think Trump will come back with new demands, or even threats, towards his European allies? What could he ask for this time? It’s possible. The American president’s logic is transactional: alliance means obligations, cost and reciprocity. He could demand a faster rise in defence spending, a bigger European contribution to Ukraine, more purchases of American weapons systems, a tougher stance on China, or greater support for American choices in the Middle East. Europeans need to understand that the answer can’t just be rhetorical. Strategic autonomy without military capability is a political slogan. Credibility comes from resources, industry, technology, readiness and political decision-making. In the book I’ve recently edited, titled “A Just Society Is Not a Utopia — It’s a Choice,” the argument is that societies are judged by their choices. The same is true of states: security is never an abstract value; it is an organised political choice. If European states want less dependence, they have to accept the corresponding cost. Otherwise, they will keep demanding strategic autonomy while working with the resources of strategic dependence. Is creating a “European NATO” the solution for Europeans if they genuinely want to become independent of the US? How could that be built, on what timeframe, and could it actually work? The term “European NATO” is more a political metaphor than an immediate institutional plan. I’m not among those who argue NATO should simply be replicated. The European member states of the Alliance need to acquire the capabilities that the US currently provides to a large extent. That means joint defence planning, a strong industrial base, joint procurement, strategic transport, air defence, satellite capability, cyber-defence, intelligence and reliable command structures. The timeframe isn’t short. Genuine European defence autonomy requires at least a decade of systematic investment and political continuity. It also requires political agreement on who decides, who pays and who bears the risk when the use of force becomes necessary. The realistic solution, then, isn’t to replace NATO, but to build up European strength within NATO, and in parallel through the EU. European countries need to become less dependent on the US, without climbing aboard the anti-American bandwagon. Autonomy in this sense doesn’t mean distancing from the Alliance; it means the capacity to take on responsibility when Washington’s interests or priorities don’t fully align with Europe’s. That said, the goal isn’t a new organisation to replace NATO, but for European countries to be able to stand seriously within it. In practice, that means European capitals need to treat defence as a long-term function of the state, not an occasional reaction to crises. 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