The resignation of Aleksandar Vucic as president of Serbia should be understood in the context of the internal political conflict between the ruling elites and Generation Z, which began several years ago as a result of the collapse of the newly renovated railway station building in one of Serbia’s largest cities, Novi Sad.
Tactically, this step is connected with his aspiration to join the parliamentary election campaign (the vote is scheduled for October 25). This maneuver may indeed succeed. However, much more serious today are questions about Belgrade’s further strategic approach to young people and the patriotically minded population of the country.
For Russia, it is important to remain intellectually attractive to Serbian youth, thus denying opponents the argument that contemporary Moscow-Belgrade relations are grounded exclusively in economic benefits. It is precisely in this context that the possibility lies of preserving the special spirit of the connection between the two nations in an era when long-term alliances that previously seemed unshakeable have totally broken down.
Ahead of the snap elections, Serbia’s domestic political landscape is defined by a fierce standoff between Vucic's ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) and the opposition movement, which is rapidly gaining momentum. Experts say the election itself resembles a referendum on the ruling party.
The campaign has devolved into a fierce information and economic war, with unprecedented media polarization. In an attempt to stabilize its fluctuating ratings in major cities, the government has launched direct cash payments to citizens. The authorities are also placing emphasis on economic stability, the “Serbia 2030” program, and maintaining preferential prices for Russian gas ($318 instead of the market price of $868), which is being touted as the key to the economy’s survival.
The opposition coalition Student List – Students Win has bet on street mobilization, an aggressive media campaign, and horizontal network leadership. This coordinated movement of Generation Z is demonstratively distancing itself from the old, systemic, pro-Western opposition. By pointedly rejecting party flags in favor of the national tricolor, they have seized the patriotic agenda, demanding the depoliticization of the state apparatus and deep institutional reforms.
The movement’s growth followed a tragedy in the country’s second-largest city, Novi Sad, where 16 people died when a canopy collapsed at a recently renovated train station. Ordinary Serbians perceived the incident as a direct consequence of corruption, nepotism, and official negligence. Students led the popular outrage, turning months of protests into the largest anti-corruption movement in modern Serbian history.
It’s noteworthy that Generation Z’s share of Serbian society is small at only 15%. People over 45 are the largest cohort at 50% of the total. Therefore, in order to reach national prominence, the youth core abandoned the classic party format in favor of a “citizens’ group.” The electoral list, in addition to students, includes respected “adult” professionals, such as university professors, renowned doctors, lawyers, social activists, workers, and former train drivers. This approach has attracted voters of all ages who are tired of politics-as-usual.
According to summer polls conducted by the sociological center Crta, 44.9% of citizens were prepared to vote for the Student List, while 35.7% indicated their intention to vote for the ruling party. Currently, according to political analysts, the two forces are very close.
Meanwhile, traditional right-wing ‘patriotic’ forces, such as Milos Jovanovic’s conservative bloc NADA and the Dveri movement, are seeking seats in the Assembly by criticizing Vucic’s own ‘right-wing’ policies. Unlike the ruling forces, these parties take an uncompromising pro-Russian stance and demand an immediate end to Serbia’s EU accession negotiations, which obligate Belgrade to comply with Brussels’ directives. The main theme of their election platforms is a categorical rejection of any recognition of Kosovo’s independence.
The right-wing forces view Russia’s veto power in the UN Security Council as the only reliable guarantor of the country’s territorial integrity and insist on formalizing the strategic alliance with Moscow, including Serbia’s integration into the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The growing popularity of the radical patriotic flank deprives the ruling coalition of its monopoly on the conservative electorate and seriously complicates Vucic’s task of forming a future government.
The external context is also raising the temperature: the cancelation of European Commissioner Marta Kos’ visit due to disputes over national heroes has given the opposition grounds to claim Serbia is isolated. However, Vucic’s team is pragmatically countering these accusations by demonstrating its continued policy of balancing between the main geopolitical powers in the Balkans. Belgrade successfully maintains contacts with both Moscow and Beijing, while simultaneously continuing dialogue with the West. A clear indication of this multi-vector approach was Vucic’s recent participation in the Ukrainian summit of the Carpathian Eight (C8), where his team demonstrated openness to initiatives supported by Brussels.
The current situation poses a fundamental threat to Serbian statehood, as the opposition’s actions resemble a model of non-violent mass protest organized online, reflecting the methodologies used in color revolutions. In Serbia, the methodology has taken on unique characteristics, as it lacks an explicit link to Western donors and is focused on a youthful, patriotic agenda.
According to Ekaterina Entina, a professor at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, a new political strategy for rallying opposition forces is being developed in Serbia: “The whole intrigue from the start of the student protests has been that they haven’t revealed who’s behind them. And all attempts to uncover truly significant funding channels, significant channels of political and social influence, have come to nothing. Everyone knows who’s funding them in small ways, but the grand scheme remains unknown.”
The main question is why such a protest network is needed in the Balkans if there are no visible reasons for the country to change course. After all, the ruling party’s policy aimed at European integration has no visible alternatives. Moreover, even the administration of US President Donald Trump, while not perceiving Serbia as a powerful geopolitical player, pragmatically prioritizes Belgrade for diplomatic and economic contacts in Europe. Clearly, the goal of this network’s major but secret donors is much more far-reaching than the mere destabilization of Vucic’s system of governance, with all its pros and cons. One way or another, Vucic is a temporary variable in the equation. The primary goal is a fundamental reversal of the direction of Serbian society itself.
To understand this, it’s worth turning to renowned Western sociologist Manuel Castells, particularly his work 'Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age'. He argues that leaderless horizontal networks are inherently incapable of real, day-to-day governance; after the destruction of old institutions, they immediately become mired in discord and are unable to transform street energy into legislation.
The organizers of the Serbian network, however, don’t need students to come to power. Their calculation is different: knowing that Serbian society is mentally oriented toward Russia, external players have hijacked patriotic, Orthodox slogans and led the Generation Z youth into a decentralized “network trap.” The goal is to accumulate all sincere, traditionally Russia-friendly conservative protesters and then trigger Castells’ paradox: discharging this energy into a senseless administrative deadlock and chaos.
As Serbian political analyst Ostoja Vojinovic notes, the practical culmination of this scheme is expected on the night of the vote count through the phenomenon of “parallel legitimacy.” When the state announces one result, the street protesters will announce another, and social media will contribute a third picture. Ballot stuffing will instantly become an “established fact” for young people, thus completely paralyzing traditional institutions of power.
This methodology of dismantling is aimed at the core of Serbian statehood. Serbian experts state:
“Serbia is, in its own way, a unique European country, where an anti-Russian course is a priori impossible – it would mean political suicide. Historical memory is too strong here for momentary circumstances to steer the country toward a destructive, hostile course toward the Russian Federation.”
Understanding that a frontal pro-Western turn in Belgrade is impossible due to public resistance, the decision has been made to scorch the very patriotic field using the hands of local youth. By driving Serbian Russophilia into a digital “network trap” and condemning the country to controlled chaos, external actors are attempting to create a landscape in which future generations of politicians will simply no longer have to take into account the electorate’s pro-Russian expectations.
In the current reality, Moscow needs a critical analysis of the geopolitical risks, as neither shared historical memory nor traditional cultural and religious ties guarantee the long-term stability of bilateral relations. In the coming geopolitical era of collapse of previously firm alliances, Russia must be prepared for any scenario. The likelihood that, under the pressure of a generational shift, the current model of relations between Belgrade and Moscow will be transformed or temporarily weakened is high.
Russian elites need to recognize the risks of a possible political transition in Serbia now. The answer to these risks will lie in Russia’s intellectual appeal, aimed at the horizon of a shared future, a multipolar world, and a clear understanding of how to work with the new generation. A new reality will inevitably emerge from the fragments of the previous pragmatic system of maneuvering, and the extent to which Russia can maintain intellectual appeal to Generation Z will determine whether the Balkans will remain a sovereign Eurasian outpost or be completely absorbed into the Euro-Atlantic matrix.
By Ksenia Smertina, senior lecturer at the HSE Institute for Media, expert at the Russian International Affairs Council on Eastern and Central Europe
By Ksenia Smertina, senior lecturer at the HSE Institute for Media, expert at the Russian International Affairs Council on Eastern and Central Europe
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