Surrounded by liars, Mr Anastasiades?

A few questions from a young man who apparently cannot grasp the basicsBy Dimitris Xenofontos In his recent podcast appearance with Marinos Nomikos, Nicos Anastasiades repeated his familiar narrative: Turkey, he argued, was not ready to abolish the unilateral right of intervention and was in fact undermining the settlement by pressuring Mustafa Akinci at Crans-Montana in 2017. What I still cannot understand is this: why would Turkey come so close to a settlement, with obvious incentives on the table, only to walk away at the last moment? The question, then, is not simply who is right. The real question is how many people must be dismissed as liars for Mr Anastasiades’ version of events to survive. Mr Anastasiades invokes Akinci’s credibility when it suits his argument. But when Akinci spoke publicly about a two-state proposal, we were apparently not supposed to believe him. The same applies to Mevlut Cavusoglu. When Cavusoglu supposedly said publicly that Turkey had no intention of abolishing the unilateral right of intervention, we were expected to take him seriously – which is why Mr Anastasiades cited him. But when Cavusoglu also spoke about the two-state proposal, then, suddenly, he was lying. But let us accept, for the sake of argument, that both Akinci and Cavusoglu are unreliable because one is Turkish Cypriot and the other Turkish. Was the late archbishop also imagining things? And what about those who privately admit that two states were discussed, but do not have the archbishop’s courage to say so publicly? Are they unreliable too? Then there is Espen Barth Eide, who, according to Mr Anastasiades’ version, heard one thing and wrote another. In other words, a UN official was allegedly feeding false information on a matter of the highest national importance – and the Republic did nothing? If that is the case, why was there never an institutional investigation? Why was the issue of the UN being misled never raised formally? Mr Anastasiades has also suggested that Makarios Drousiotis was under Eide’s influence. But if that is the case, why is Drousiotis the problem rather than Eide himself? Can this claim be proven? And if so, how? Through surveillance by the Cyprus Intelligence Service? Was a UN official being monitored? Was there legal authorisation for this? When Kyriacos Kouros, then head of the Cyprus Intelligence Service, reportedly confirmed that Eide was indeed being monitored – as Drousiotis has written, without this being denied by those named – where exactly should that testimony be placed? In the realm of fantasy, or among the inconvenient facts? Even if we accept the claim that Eide was spreading falsehoods, Mr Anastasiades still does not explain his motive. Why would Eide do this? I can list possible reasons why Mr Anastasiades may have walked away from Crans-Montana. Can he list even one convincing reason why Eide would supposedly spread false information? Then there is Ioannis Kasoulides. He stated, word for word, that “Anastasiades was saying at the time that you cannot reach an agreement with the Turks and that we will end up with two states”, and that he told him never to say such a thing again. What are we supposed to assume? That Kasoulides also misunderstood? Then there is Jean-Claude Juncker, who stated that, in his view, “the main problem was not Erdogan and it was not Akinci, but the south of the island, because it was not ready to make the leap.” Let me guess, Mr Anastasiades: Juncker was lying too. Everyone is lying. But let us leave aside what Mr Anastasiades might dismiss as gossip. There are also the UN minutes. According to those minutes, the secretary-general interjected by saying that what he personally “could testify” was that Turkey could accept an end to the right of intervention in the context of a settlement where all the necessary elements were in place. Mr Anastasiades then insisted that Greece and his own delegation had submitted their proposals, and asked Mr Cavusoglu why Turkey had not presented its own proposal. Mr Cavusoglu replied that the secretary-general had “just said it” – Turkey’s position on guarantees. Mr Anastasiades then insisted that he did not understand what Turkey was proposing, because there were “so many ambiguities”. Returning to his non-paper, the secretary-general drew the delegations’ attention to three elements in particular: the central role given to the secretary-general; the inclusive nature of the mechanism, which left no ambiguities; and the fact that Turkey, Greece and the UK would not have any executive power. On that basis, the secretary-general said he did not think the proposed mechanism could be understood as a “Treaty of Guarantee in all but name”. And when Mr Anastasiades again suggested that the proposal was “ambiguous”, the secretary-general replied: “It was not ambiguous. It could be rejected, but it was not ambiguous.” How many people must be lying for Mr Anastasiades’ version of events to remain intact? In the end, I still do not understand. Kasoulides exaggerated. Akinci and Cavusoglu were spreading Turkish propaganda. Juncker misunderstood. Eide misled everyone. The UN minutes, we are told, require interpretation. The archbishop said something we were not supposed to take seriously. And in the middle of this extraordinary confusion, the only person who saw clearly, heard correctly and remembers flawlessly is Mr Anastasiades. It is a very convenient version of events. The problem is that, at some point, it collides with the facts. And facts, however tiresome they may be, have a habit of persisting. Of course, the public can judge. According to a RetailZoom poll published by Politis, only 1 per cent of respondents ranked Mr Anastasiades as the most honest president Cyprus has ever had. Interpret the UN minutes however you wish. But portraying so many people, from different backgrounds and with different interests, as liars – while effectively suggesting that they all suffered some kind of collective delusion – is not just unconvincing. It is insulting to the public.