By RT newsroom, a team of multi-lingual journalists with over a decade of experience in Russian and international reporting, delivering original research and insights often missing from mainstream coverage
By RT newsroom, a team of multi-lingual journalists with over a decade of experience in Russian and international reporting, delivering original research and insights often missing from mainstream coverage
A recent Bloomberg article with the eye-catching headline ‘Russia’s Push to Replace Dollar With China’s Yuan Collapses’ purports to demonstrate that Russia has abandoned attempts to replace the dollar with the yuan due to US sanctions.
It points out that the share of the yuan in payments for Russian exports has been cut in half this year to 22%, from a peak in mid-2024, when the US expanded secondary sanctions. The article goes on to demonstrate at length the problems Russian businesses are having with yuan payments, boasting that Chinese banks shied away from dealing with Russia after the US threatened secondary sanctions.
Has the West finally succeeded in stifling Russia’s access to foreign-currency markets? RT examines what’s really going on and exposes the gap between Western hopes and economic reality.
Bloomberg cites the beginning of the pivot away from direct yuan settlement with the threat of US secondary sanctions in mid-2024, calling this a demonstration of America’s “ability to enforce its political will, even with the world’s second-largest economy.”
Russian businesses did find themselves in a bind with payments often blocked or returned. Cumbersome workarounds had to be found. Russian banks, which had begun lending in yuan in lieu of dollars or euro, were forced to pull back.
The result, according to Bloomberg, is that the share of the yuan in direct settlement of Russian exports has fallen sharply, reaching 22% this year.
That Russia has had significant problems with yuan payments is beyond dispute and openly admitted by Russian officials.
Bloomberg stops just where the economic analysis should begin
What the Bloomberg journalists didn’t feel any need to explain, however, was a paradox they themselves introduced right at the outset of the article: Russia’s trade with China is growing even as the yuan has plummeted as a settlement currency for Russian exports.
Not just are Russian-Chinese trade volumes growing, they are doing so at a brisk pace. Chinese customs data for the first nine months of 2026 shows a 30.6% year-on-year increase in the dollar value of bilateral trade to around $214 billion.
So clearly the drop in direct yuan payments has not caused the underlying trading relationship to collapse.
Bloomberg does mention one rather interesting statistic: The share of the ruble in settlement for Russian exports to Asia has surged to 69%, up from 47.6% the year before. A country breakdown is not provided and China cannot be fully equated with Asia, but given that China is Russia’s largest trade partner and responsible for a third of its foreign trade, it is a fair bet that Russia is being paid in rubles for a lot of its trade with China.
The Russian central bank’s second-quarter 2026 balance-of-payments assessment confirms the broader trend. It shows a consistent, across-the-board rise in ruble settlement for foreign trade: 63% of incoming export payments were in rubles, up from 53% the year before. The share of ruble payments from Asian countries reached 62%, while rubles accounted for 55% of import payments.
Bloomberg references the rising ruble share but leaves it completely hanging. So this raises a few questions that Bloomberg made no effort to answer. If bilateral trade remains strong but yuan settlement for Russian exports has decreased, how exactly is settlement taking place? Are the two countries netting obligations? Are they netting through intermediaries? Or are other assets, such as gold, being used to reconcile the accounts? We aren't told.
In April 2025, Reuters reported that major Russian banks had established a special system for China-related transactions known as the China Track. The system uses payment agents to handle export and import transactions, which are then centrally balanced by the participating banks, thus avoiding the need for SWIFT or accounts held with Western banks.
The principle is fairly simple. Imagine that China buys $100 million worth of Russian oil, while Russian companies purchase $80 million worth of Chinese machinery. Rather than transferring the export proceeds back to Russia and then arranging a separate payment to China, the two obligations can be offset against one another. The export proceeds are used to finance the imports, leaving only the residual balance to be settled.
Russia’s financial watchdog chief, Yury Chikhanchin, described essentially this arrangement to President Vladimir Putin in July 2025, explaining that exporters could allow importers to use export proceeds rather than repatriating the funds. The transactions would then be reconciled domestically.
This is important because netting is a more mundane, but potentially much more consequential, development than the emergence of some entirely new international currency.
It means that substantial volumes of bilateral trade can take place without the corresponding payments having to pass through conventional international banking channels. The system does still require banks and mechanisms for reconciling outstanding obligations, but it reduces the need for money to cross borders in the traditional way.
One statistic that is worth noting, meanwhile, is that Russian gold has been flooding Hong Kong this year. Trade data shows that Hong Kong imported around 100 tonnes of gold from Russia during the first seven months of this year. This is nearly three times the amount shipped during the same period last year.
So we have an explosion in Russian gold exports through Hong Kong while actual Russian-Chinese trade has continued to grow. Crucially, much of this gold subsequently travels to mainland China. Might there be a connection? This looks very much like a potential alternative channel for squaring residual balances outside of conventional banking channels.
However, we can’t know for sure that this is happening. It should also be mentioned that Russia has been a major seller of gold this year, which is connected with its budget deficit. Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina explained in September that the reduction in Russia’s gold reserves was mainly connected with Finance Ministry operations involving the National Wealth Fund under the government’s budget rule. In effect, the state is drawing on its gold holdings as part of the mechanism for managing the budget deficit.
No breakdown of the gold moving to Hong Kong is available. Neither country discloses bespoke settlement ledgers, and neither has made any official announcement of a formal gold-based settlement arrangement. But the gold moving through Hong Kong may very well be a combination of deficit-related financing and sanctions-proof trade settlement. The two purposes would in fact reinforce each other.
Gold is a very suitable asset for settling residual balances, and it can be done at the state or central-bank level. It could be used to settle what remains after China Track netting. If Russia and China are going down this route, gold would then function as the ultimate settlement asset, while rubles and yuan would simply be transactional currencies.
Western media coverage tends to ask whether Russia is succeeding or failing at replacing the dollar with another currency, which presupposes that the essential architecture remains unchanged. Bloomberg operates out of exactly that framework, presenting the declining yuan share in Russian exports as evidence of a failed attempt to internationalize the yuan.
This is a dubious assumption. A more fundamental question is whether the architecture itself is changing. Perhaps currency statistics are no longer giving us a complete picture of how international value is being transferred. Perhaps we’re bumping into the limitations of thinking about monetary realignment primarily in terms of competing national currencies.
What we are seeing is that a growing volume of international trade is taking place that doesn’t require the same financial architecture that historically made the dollar indispensable.
Russia and China remain at the forefront of that process, whatever the fluctuating breakdown of currency settlement might be.
© Autonomous Nonprofit Organization “TV-Novosti”, 2005–2026. All rights reserved.
This website uses cookies. Read RT Privacy policy to find out more.