What a changing Nato means for Cyprus and the future of European defence

‘Many EU member states consider Turkey an indispensable component of European defence because of its military capabilities’As Nato prepares for the July 7 Summit in Ankara, with defence industry, investment and support for Ukraine heading the agenda, discussions over burden-sharing between the United States and Europe are likely to accelerate a broader shift in the continent’s security architecture, which could leave Cyprus facing difficult strategic choices over Turkey’s future role in European defence. The summit is expected to formalise ongoing discussions between Washington and its European allies over a gradual reduction of the American military footprint in Europe, with European countries expected to assume greater responsibility for their own security. “The United States has made it clear that it wants to reduce its military presence in Europe,” Senior Policy Advisor and Head of the Observatory of Geopolitics and Diplomacy at the Hellenic Foundation for Foreign and European Policy Ino Afentouli told the Cyprus Mail, adding that this extends beyond troop numbers to include air, naval and other strategic assets. Ankara ahead of the NATO summit to be held on July 7-8, Turkey While public statements by US President Donald Trump often attract headlines, the process itself has been under discussion for some time and in a structured and coordinated manner between allies. “What we are seeing is effectively a new division of labour within Nato,” Afentouli said. She stressed that the transition would not happen overnight, but through long-term planning and negotiations largely conducted at military and strategic levels. When asked how this might affect Cyprus or Greece whether directly or indirectly, she said the implications may be indirect rather than immediate. “The issue is not that Cyprus or Greece themselves will be directly affected,” she said. “The issue is how the balance within Nato’s southern flank changes.” Afentouli said that if Europe is to compensate for a reduced US role, countries which are members of Nato but not of the European Union will inevitably become more important. Chief among these, she noted, is Turkey. “Turkey has the second-largest military in Nato,” she said, adding that countries such as the United Kingdom, Norway and Canada would also play a greater role. This shift, she suggested, presents a strategic challenge for both Cyprus and Greece. “The question that should concern Cyprus and Greece is whether this enhanced role could reinforce Turkey’s perception of its own regional influence”. Afentouli stopped short of suggesting that Turkey’s growing strategic importance would translate into direct military pressure against either Greece or Cyprus but regarding Cyprus specifically, she said that Ankara’s leverage over the island remains primarily political rather than military. “Now, if there is a possibility, for example, that Turkey could react if a country such as France strengthens its defence cooperation with Cyprus, again, it cannot really react, because France is also a member state and has the right to make its own choices”, adding that “the field in which Turkey seeks to influence Cyprus is the political process surrounding the Cyprus problem, not the defence sphere”. The debate over Cyprus’ future relationship with Nato has resurfaced in recent months, particularly following discussions surrounding the European Union’s mutual defence clause, Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union, and wider questions of European security guarantees. Afentouli said the discussion on this was healthy and should continue; “it is beneficial for Cyprus to keep this discussion alive and for political forces to engage with it seriously”. However, when asked about recent discussions in the public sphere concerning Cyprus’ accession to Nato as a resolution to the island’s division, she cautioned against viewing Nato membership as a straightforward solution to the Cyprus problem and described such scenarios as highly complex. “A direct accession to Nato is unrealistic under current circumstances,” she said. Instead, she suggested that a more plausible pathway, similar to Malta’s historical relationship with the alliance, would involve some form of partnership status. Yet even this would require unanimous agreement among Nato member states – including Turkey. Senior Policy Advisor and Head of the Observatory of Geopolitics and Diplomacy at the Hellenic Foundation for Foreign and European Policy Ino Afentouli “Turkey would not automatically consent,” she said. “It would only do so if it saw advantages within a broader settlement framework.” As a result, any movement towards closer Nato ties for Cyprus would likely need to be linked to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, including arrangements on security guarantees and the future presence of foreign troops. She explained that “if we assume that the two sides reach a settlement, within the existing framework for a solution, namely that of the United Nations, and if we reached a solution and the question arose of how the Turkish Cypriots would be protected, for example – that is, the issue of security – and likewise the issue of the security of the Greek Cypriots, there would have to be a withdrawal of Turkish troops and the installation of a force which could indeed be a force made up of Nato member states. “In that case, possibly including both Turkey and Greece”. While theoretically possible, Afentouli described such a scenario as “highly ambitious” under current political conditions. “The only actor capable of exerting sufficient pressure to move in that direction would be the United States,” she said, while acknowledging that this remains hypothetical. More immediate, she added, is the question of Turkey’s growing involvement in European defence initiatives outside Nato. As the European Union seeks to strengthen its defence capabilities in response to the war in Ukraine and concerns over future American commitments, pressure is increasing to establish mechanisms allowing closer cooperation with powerful non-EU Nato allies, including Turkey. “Many EU member states consider Turkey an indispensable component of European defence because of its military capabilities,” Afentouli said. This creates what she described as a difficult strategic dilemma for both Cyprus and Greece. Until now, both countries have resisted efforts to expand Turkey’s role in European defence structures, arguing that Ankara’s continuing policies towards Cyprus and Greece do not justify such concessions. However, maintaining this position may become increasingly difficult, she added. “If we end up with many countries cooperating with Turkey, as is happening with Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom and Poland, there will be pressure for special arrangements”. In that context, Cyprus and Greece may need to consider whether their consent could be exchanged for political concessions elsewhere. “They will need to think carefully about a flexible strategic response,” Afentouli said. But then, what does this mean for the wider region of the Eastern Mediterranean? There is a major strategic gap in both Nato and EU policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean, she said. “There is no coherent policy for the Mediterranean,” she added, highlighting that divisions among European countries over Israel and Arab states have prevented the development of a unified approach. As a result, she said, the United States remains the only decisive external actor in the region. “The European Union is essentially absent from the Mediterranean as a strategic actor,” she said. With Brussels increasingly focused on Ukraine and the eastern flank, Afentouli said that Mediterranean member states, including Cyprus and Greece, may ultimately need to take the initiative themselves. “For countries like Cyprus and Greece, the southern flank remains a vital security issue,” she said. “They cannot afford to ignore it.”