Who Is the “Second Israel”? The Kurds — or Turkey?

Op-eds Israelkurdistanturkey Who Is the “Second Israel”? The Kurds — or Turkey? 2023 11 29t094506z 171512176 Rc2wm4ae6bi7 Rtrmadp 3 Turkey Security Kurds Relevant News Who Is the “Second Israel”? The Kurds — or Turkey? 24 August 2026 How Cyprus funds its parties, and what 2026 exposed 24 August 2026 What If Mark Zuckerberg Is Right? 24 August 2026 newsroom 24 August 2026 FacebookXWhatsAppEmailPrintViber It Is Time to Hold the Mirror to History, Not to the Kurds By Aslan Muhsin For years, whenever the Kurdish question is discussed in Turkey, the same accusation has been repeated in different forms: “Kurdistan is an Israeli project.”“The Kurds are Israel’s proxies.”“Kurdistan will be a second Israel.” These statements have been repeated so often that, for some, slogans have taken the place of evidence. But history does not speak through slogans. It speaks through documents. And when we examine the historical record, the first mirror should be held up to Turkey’s own history before such accusations are directed at the Kurds. Let us begin with a simple question: If military, commercial, diplomatic, economic and intelligence relations with Israel are enough to make a people or a political entity an “Israeli project,” why is this standard not first applied to Turkey itself? The Record of Turkish-Israeli Relations Particularly during the 1990s, relations between Turkey and Israel went far beyond ordinary diplomatic contact. The two countries established cooperation in military training and defence industries. Joint military activities were conducted, defence projects were developed, and Israeli defence companies played a role in the modernisation of certain Turkish military platforms. These are not conspiracy theories. They are part of the history of relations between two states. In 1996, Turkey and Israel signed a Free Trade Agreement. Economic and investment relations were also developed, creating a substantial network of cooperation between the two countries over many years. So let us ask again: Did the Kurds sign these agreements? No. The Republic of Turkey did. Therefore, anyone who attempts to delegitimise Kurdish national aspirations by associating them with Israel should first answer a basic question: If maintaining relations with Israel makes a people an “Israeli project,” what definition should be applied to Turkey, which maintained extensive state-to-state relations with Israel? Oil, Ceyhan and the Politics of Selective Memory There is another important dimension to this debate: energy. Azerbaijani oil reaches Ceyhan through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. Ceyhan is a strategically important centre in regional energy trade. In previous periods, Azerbaijani oil was transported from Ceyhan by tanker to Israel’s Ashkelon port, a route documented in publicly available sources and energy-sector records. Turkey also derives economic benefits from the transit and operation of the BTC pipeline on its territory. There is nothing inherently criminal about this. States conduct energy trade, operate pipelines and establish economic relationships according to their interests. The real question is why relationships, considered normal state policy when conducted by Turkey, suddenly become evidence of “betrayal” or an “Israeli project” when the subject is the Kurds. This is where the double standard begins. If Ceyhan has been an important part of Israel’s energy supply chain, why should that fact be turned into an accusation against the Kurds? Why should agreements made by a state that the Kurds did not control repeatedly become propaganda against Kurdish national aspirations? A People Is Not Another State’s Project There have certainly been historical relations between Israel and various Kurdish political actors and communities. There is no reason to deny that. History is complicated, and political movements do not exist in complete isolation from international relations. But one fundamental distinction must be made: The fact that a state has maintained relations with the Kurds does not mean that the Kurds were created by that state. Kurdish history predates the establishment of the modern State of Israel by many centuries. The history of a people cannot be reduced to the foreign policy of states that have supported, opposed or engaged with that people. If we accepted such logic, almost no national movement in the modern world could be considered an authentic historical actor in its own right. Frantz Fanon’s writings on colonialism remain relevant here. One of the central issues in his work was the way domination operates not only through control of territory, but also through control over how oppressed peoples understand themselves and how their political aspirations are described. From this perspective, an important question emerges: Why should a people’s demand for freedom be explained primarily as the project of an outside power rather than heard as the political expression of that people itself? Perhaps because recognising the Kurds as an independent political subject—capable of articulating their own aspirations—remains uncomfortable for some political forces. Abdullah Öcalan: One Individual Does Not Represent an Entire Nation There is another distinction that must be made clearly. Abdullah Öcalan is not the Kurdish nation. No political leader, armed organisation or ideological movement can single-handedly represent the entire history, will and future of millions of people. Presenting Öcalan as the unquestionable and sole representative of the Kurdish people ignores the political diversity within Kurdish society. More importantly, it risks reducing the future of an entire people to the political legacy or ideological framework of one individual. In my view, Öcalan’s political leadership and claim to represent the Kurdish people must remain open to serious scrutiny and criticism. Many Kurds and other observers have argued that his political decisions, alliances and ideological choices have, at various points, conflicted with or constrained broader Kurdish national aspirations. From this perspective, he should not be treated as the indispensable leader of Kurdish liberation, but as a highly controversial political figure whose legacy must be examined critically—including his decisions, alliances and the consequences of his political strategy. Calling him a traitor, a sellout or a coward may express the anger of those who strongly oppose his politics, but the larger principle is more important: The Kurdish nation is greater than any individual leader. The future of the Kurds should not depend on the political sanctification of any one person. What Is the Real Fear? The political language that labels the Kurds the “Second Israel” is not simply about foreign policy. At its core lies another question: What happens if an independent Kurdish political will emerges? The accusation that a national movement is merely a “foreign project” is often less an analysis than a tool of political delegitimisation. Instead of debating a people’s right to determine its own political future, it becomes easier to portray that people as a proxy for another state. Then there is no need to address Kurdish history. No need to discuss identity. No need to confront the history of discrimination, denial, displacement or cultural repression. It is enough to repeat: “This is a foreign project.” Fanon’s ideas remain powerful precisely because domination can operate not only through force, but also by persuading people that their own aspirations are somehow illegitimate or externally manufactured. But Kurdish aspirations for political freedom were not invented abroad. The Kurdish language was not invented abroad. Kurdish history was not invented abroad. The collective memory and identity of the Kurdish people were not manufactured in another state’s laboratory. So Who Is the “Second Israel”? Let us answer the question using consistent standards rather than slogans. Who signed military agreements with Israel? Who developed defence-industry cooperation? Who conducted military training with Israel? Who signed a Free Trade Agreement with Israel? Who maintained extensive state-to-state relations with Israel for decades? Who became an important transit country in an energy route through which oil could reach Israel? The answer is clear: Turkey. This does not mean that Turkey’s historical relations with Israel were, by themselves, illegitimate. States establish international relationships according to their interests. But it is intellectually dishonest to describe those same kinds of relationships as legitimate statecraft when Turkey conducts them, while portraying every relationship involving Kurds as proof of treason or foreign manipulation. That is a double standard. And ultimately, it is another way of denying the Kurds the status of an independent political actor. The future of the Kurds may be debated. Independence, federalism, confederalism and other democratic political arrangements can all be subjects of legitimate political discussion. But one principle should be beyond dispute: The political future of the Kurdish people should not be determined by labels imposed upon them by others. Calling Kurdistan the “Second Israel” is not an analysis. In many cases, it functions as a political slogan designed to delegitimise Kurdish aspirations for self-determination. Before holding the mirror up to the Kurds, perhaps it is time to hold it up to history—and to ourselves. Because sometimes the answer is not found in the loudest slogans, but in the documents signed by states. And when those documents speak, one question becomes even more difficult to avoid: Who is the “Second Israel”? Kurdistan? Or Turkey, which established extensive state-to-state relations with Israel in military, economic, commercial and diplomatic fields? The answer should not be determined by slogans. Let the historical record speak. And remember: Every lie told to delegitimize a people’s aspiration for freedom eventually faces the judgment of history. Those who wish to determine the future of the Kurds should first listen to the Kurds themselves. No nation should be expected to surrender its aspirations forever simply to ease the fears of others. “Our dog is barking at another person’s door.”— Kurdish proverb Subscribe to our Newsletter Latest News How Cyprus funds its parties, and what 2026 exposed What If Mark Zuckerberg Is Right? 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