Yes to the GSI, but Je suis Makis Keravnos! A €2bn mistake would be catastrophic

Opinion economyGreat Sea Interconnectorpolice Yes to the GSI, but Je suis Makis Keravnos! A €2bn mistake would be catastrophic Keraunos Gsi Relevant News Musk backs Kasidiaris… 7 September 2026 Yes to the GSI, but Je suis Makis Keravnos! A €2bn mistake would be catastrophic 7 September 2026 Has the artist been paid? 7 September 2026 Giorgos Kallinikou 7 September 2026 FacebookXWhatsAppEmailPrintViber Some projects get judged on whether they’re technically feasible. Some get judged on whether they’re politically desirable. And some, because of their sheer size and cost, have to be judged first and foremost by a much harder question: can you actually stomach the risk if things go wrong? The Cyprus-Greece electricity interconnector, the GSI, belongs firmly in that third category. The debate around this project keeps getting trapped between excitement over its strategic importance and the scramble for geopolitical cover. But from day one there’s been a factor that simply cannot be pushed aside, no matter how strong the political case for the project is: economic viability. Finance Minister Makis Keravnos has put this front and centre since the talks began. He’s still putting it front and centre now. And he has every reason to keep doing so. Let’s not forget what came before. When Keravnos insisted there weren’t enough studies to justify this scale of financial risk for the Republic of Cyprus, he came under attack and heavy criticism for it. Yet the project was ultimately shelved, and both governments agreed a new economic study was needed. In other words: time vindicated Keravnos’s caution. Which is exactly why his latest intervention, a few days ago, shouldn’t be read as just another delay, or an attempt to torpedo the project. It’s simply a finance minister doing the basic job he owes to taxpayers. Keravnos himself pointed out that the Greek and Cypriot leaderships have agreed the European Investment Bank’s study needs updating, because economic and technical issues have emerged that need re-examining and clarifying. First, a distinction needs making. Securing geopolitical cover doesn’t remove the need to establish viability through an economic study, and it doesn’t work the other way round either. One question asks whether the project can go ahead without running into an external veto, threat or interference. The other asks whether the cost, technical specifications, financing and benefits justify committing public money. Neither condition substitutes for the other. A project can be geopolitically essential and economically troubled at the same time. Equally, it can look attractive on paper economically while facing serious geopolitical risk in practice. That’s exactly why political statements aren’t enough. What’s needed are answers: crystal clear, specific, and in writing. Is there a study proving the GSI will bring down electricity costs in Cyprus? By how much, and by when? What will it ultimately cost Cypriot consumers? How much of the risk does the Cypriot state carry? What happens if there are delays, cost overruns, or the interconnector fails to work? And above all: who picks up the bill if things don’t play out the way the optimistic scenarios predict? These aren’t the questions of people who “don’t want the project.” They’re the questions any serious state has to ask before signing a multi-billion-euro agreement. Ending Cyprus’s energy isolation clearly has strategic value. But strategic value alone doesn’t justify signing a blank cheque. However much we want this project to happen, however nationally important we think it is, however much we celebrate every time a new investor or political agreement appears, the Republic of Cyprus cannot put its signature on a two-billion-euro project without knowing precisely what we’re buying, what it’ll cost us, and what risk we’re taking on. Cyprus is a small state. It doesn’t have the luxury of making mistakes, let alone huge ones. It cannot afford to approach a project like this with a “we’ll figure it out as we go” attitude. That kind of thinking might be tolerable on a small project. On a multi-billion-euro investment, it could prove catastrophic. That’s why Keravnos deserves to be heard this time too. Not because he’s automatically right every time. Because last time he insisted we stick to the numbers rather than the enthusiasm, he turned out to be right. Je suis Makis Keravnos! So let the new study go ahead. Let every economic and technical question be answered. Let viability be secured. Let it be made clear exactly who’s carrying each risk. Let there be real guarantees, not theoretical ones, for the project’s geopolitical protection. Then, let’s move forward. The goal here isn’t to prove we can build a mammoth infrastructure project. The goal is to prove that, if we build it, Cyprus can absorb the cost even if something goes wrong. That’s not fear. That’s not scaremongering. That’s not refusal. That is the basic responsibility of any serious state! Subscribe to our Newsletter Latest News Musk backs Kasidiaris… Has the artist been paid? 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