Beyond rhetoric: Israel, Turkey, Cyprus and the remaking of the Eastern Mediterranean

Op-eds GreeceIsraelturkeywar Beyond rhetoric: Israel, Turkey, Cyprus and the remaking of the Eastern Mediterranean Cyprus' President Christodoulides, Greek Pm Mitsotakis And Israeli Pm Netanyahu Meet In Nicosia Relevant News On this day: The entire action of the novel “Ulysses” by James Joyce takes place on this day 16 June 2026 Beyond rhetoric: Israel, Turkey, Cyprus and the remaking of the Eastern Mediterranean 16 June 2026 Anti-corruption chief briefs Anastasiades on ‘Mafia State’ findings 16 June 2026 newsroom 16 June 2026 FacebookXWhatsAppEmailPrintViber By Euripides L. Evriviades* The sharp exchanges between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Benjamin Netanyahu are real. The language is harsh. At times, extreme. It is tempting to dismiss them as political posturing aimed at domestic audiences. It is equally tempting to see them as a prelude to war. Both interpretations miss the point. This is not theatre. Nor is it war. It is something more consequential: a reconfiguration of power centred on control of strategic space, energy routes, trade corridors and connectivity stretching from Europe to Asia through the Middle East and the East Med. For decades, the region was shaped by the Palestinian question, Arab-Israeli relations, the wars in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, the Arab Spring, Iran’s expanding influence and the Abraham Accords. That framework is now shifting. The recent US-Israel-Iran war did not create a new Middle East. It accelerated changes already underway. Gaza and the West Bank remain morally and politically important. Yet they no longer define the region’s geopolitical order on their own. The deeper contest is unfolding elsewhere: above all in Syria, but also across Lebanon and Iraq, where fragmented authority allows regional and external actors to compete for influence. It is also unfolding across the trade, energy and connectivity corridors linking Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Corridors are no longer merely routes of commerce. They are becoming part of the battlefield. As the regional landscape shifts, states are responding according to their own strategic priorities. All invoke security. The harder question is how they pursue it—and how others interpret that pursuit. Israel seeks security through military superiority, pre-emption, strategic depth and an expanding network of partnerships. Turkey seeks to project power through military presence, unilateral maritime claims and control of strategic space stretching from northern Syria and Iraq to the East Med. The continuing occupation of part of Cyprus by NATO member Turkey provides strategic depth, maritime leverage and forward positioning within that wider geography. Infrastructure projects and other policies linking the occupied north ever more closely to the Turkish mainland reinforce the conclusion that the strategic importance Turkey attaches to Cyprus remains the principal driver of policy, with the pursuit of a negotiated settlement increasingly subordinate to that objective. The US seeks to preserve access, connectivity and freedom of manoeuvre through military power, structured partnerships and regional frameworks. Europe seeks stability through secure connectivity, resilient supply chains and diversified energy routes. Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf states prioritise stability, economic development and the avoidance of wider conflict. These actors operate within the same geography. Increasingly, their policies collide. The security dilemma is at work. The pursuit of greater security by one actor often generates greater insecurity for another. Defensive actions acquire offensive meaning. Partnerships generate counter-partnerships. Deterrence generates counter-deterrence. The result is a widening perception gap—one that can become self-fulfilling. Turkey’s reading of recent regional developments illustrates the point. Ankara interprets the growing cooperation between Israel, Greece, Cyprus and the US as part of an emerging regional security architecture that narrows its room for manoeuvre. It sees much of the same reality as an emerging structure of containment. Regardless of how Ankara interprets these developments, Cyprus is assuming greater strategic importance within the emerging regional security landscape. It can serve as a logistical bridge, humanitarian hub, diplomatic platform, intelligence point and energy connector. Nicosia’s growing defence cooperation with the US, France and other Western partners reflects a broader transformation. Cyprus is increasingly viewed as a predictable, dependable and credible security partner in a volatile region. Meanwhile, Israel increasingly sees Turkey as a long-term strategic challenger and a revisionist irredentist power. The phrase “Turkey is the new Iran” has appeared with growing frequency in parts of Israeli and US strategic discourse. The comparison is excessive. Yet it points to an emerging shift in thinking: Ankara is increasingly viewed as a systemic competitor and security threat whose regional objectives may collide with those of Israel and other regional actors. Ankara rejects that characterisation and presents its policies as the defence of legitimate national interests and security concerns. Increasingly, however, the competition is not only over power, but over the interpretation of power. Competing policies are increasingly accompanied by competing narratives. Beneath the language of connectivity lies a deeper clash between status-quo and revisionist conceptions of regional order. When such logics collide in the same geography, friction becomes inevitable. A direct Turkish-Israeli war remains unlikely. Geography, NATO, economic ties and US leverage all constrain escalation. But rivalry does not require war. It requires overlapping ambitions, incompatible maps and hardening perceptions. The East Med is no longer a peripheral basin. It has become an integral part of a wider strategic theatre linking Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Trade routes, energy corridors, digital connectivity and geopolitical influence increasingly intersect through this space. Cyprus’ increasing role within that emerging architecture brings greater relevance but also greater vulnerability. The challenge is to convert geography into strategy. That requires a strong economy, national preparedness, strategic partnerships and legal firmness. It also requires deeper institutionalised security ties with the US, including its designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally. Cyprus must never allow others to redefine it as a platform, proxy or appendage. It is a sovereign state, partially occupied, acting within international law. The changes underway are not episodic. They are structural. The contest is no longer only about who threatens whom. It is about who shapes corridors, routes, infrastructure and strategic space across a changing region. Israel and Turkey are central to that contest. The United States is helping structure it. Europe is increasingly becoming part of it. Cyprus sits at its intersection. Geography creates strategic relevance. Strategy determines whether it becomes an asset or a liability. *Ambassador (Ad Honorem). Senior Fellow at the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, University of Nicosia. Subscribe to our Newsletter Latest News On this day: The entire action of the novel “Ulysses” by James Joyce takes place on this day Anti-corruption chief briefs Anastasiades on ‘Mafia State’ findings Nicosia’s park of the future takes shape as cost climbs past €30m (photos) Trump confirms Iran deal signed, but Lebanon dispute and Israeli unease cloud breakthrough Explained: EU’s new €3 tariff on Shein, Temu orders Nearly all the world’s children exposed to climate hazards, UNICEF warns Fidan tells Holguin two-state solution is only option for Cyprus Follow en.philenews on Google News and be the first to know all the news about Cyprus and the world.