Cyprus solution far harder with today’s Turkey, warns US expert

Politics Cyprus problemTop Newsturkey Cyprus solution far harder with today’s Turkey, warns US expert Jake Haris Annita Relevant News Cyprus digital TV switch sparks 400 complaints as old network returns for three months 12 July 2026 Cyprus solution far harder with today’s Turkey, warns US expert 12 July 2026 Yellow heat warning in force as temperatures climb to 40 C 12 July 2026 Andreas Bimbishis 12 July 2026 FacebookXWhatsAppEmailPrintViber Resolving the Cyprus problem is perhaps far more difficult and complex with today’s Turkey than it was in the past, says Jake Sotiriadis, who has spent years studying how Ankara manoeuvres on the international and regional stage. Sotiriadis, who holds a PhD, spent 21 years as a US Air Force intelligence officer, during which he founded the Pentagon’s Strategic Foresight team and served as founding director of the Center for Futures Intelligence at the National Intelligence University. He is currently a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and advises the US State Department on strategic foresight. In his book The Revenge of Ideology: The Hidden Forces Reshaping Global Power, published in September 2025, he argues that powerful ideological networks of power lie behind many seemingly irrational geopolitical decisions, shaping the strategic choices states make. We met on the occasion of his visit to Cyprus, where he spoke at an event held by the Glafkos Clerides Institute. The book devotes a substantial part of its analysis to Turkey, which Sotiriadis presents as a NATO member state that has purchased Russian S-400 systems while simultaneously shaping its own geopolitical strategy — what he calls “Neo-Turkish autonomy.” How, within this framework of Turkish activity, can a solution to the Cyprus problem be achieved, and how might Cyprus and Greece respond to Ankara’s policy? Sotiriadis believes the outlook on Cyprus is difficult — but he also sets out specific steps Nicosia and Athens could take. Neo-Turkish autonomy How do you view today’s Turkey, which bears no resemblance to what we knew a decade ago? What is its role, and what game is it playing? Turkey’s role is destabilising — it is the troublemaker of the region. Full stop. What Turkey is doing, I’ve termed Neo-Turkish autonomy. It incorporates the concept of neo-Ottomanism, but what’s actually happening is that Turkey has become a global player. It has a foothold everywhere, not just in two camps at once. On one hand it wants to leverage NATO, of which it is a member, while leading an organisation of Turkic states — and my own assessment is that we’ll see this evolve into a pan-Turkic alliance of states stretching from Hungary all the way to China’s western border. This chain of Turkic states will exist, and it will eventually form a geopolitical bloc in its own right. That’s something the West will come to recognise. But it’s also a double-edged sword, because America may need this bloc to compete with China. Yet it could reach a point where it becomes uncontrollable, even by the West itself. So that’s a risk we’re running. Uncontrollable as an entity, or because Turkey itself will pursue that outcome? Consider what Turkey is doing: right now it’s waging a war within Africa over rare earths. Because the French have abandoned certain countries there, Turkey has found that vacuum and is exploiting it. Very few people realise that the largest hospital currently operating in Somalia is the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Hospital. Why is Erdoğan doing this? To control the region, its rare earths, its sphere of influence there. The “Diyanet” is a Turkish body that oversees all religious sermons. Turkey currently has an extraordinary religious network. Every single week, sermons controlled from Ankara are delivered — more than 75,000 sermons worldwide, from Europe to South America, all overseen by the Diyanet. So this is a classic example of soft power that Turkey is exercising, and neither America nor Europe has grasped it. It is the only country within NATO that maintains this kind of religious influence on a global scale. Despite an unprecedented crackdown on democracy within Turkey under Erdoğan — it is now, effectively, an authoritarian state — we’ve also seen Trump, upon returning to the White House, invite Erdoğan for a three-hour meeting after a six-year gap. Erdoğan’s message is: “I play everywhere.” He sells Bayraktars to the Ukrainians, doesn’t implement sanctions against Russia, remains in NATO, and no one says a word to him about it. So why would he stop? What does this mean for Cyprus and Greece? Cyprus is the front line of Hellenism, and the Cypriot people understand aggression better than anyone — there’s no need to even discuss that. The question is what needs to happen going forward to address this situation. I think further cooperation is needed between Greece, Cyprus and Israel — and that is happening in practice. And with America too, of course. What Greece is also doing with some smart investments — frigates, F-35s — shows it’s moving to rediscover its own deterrence doctrine for the Aegean. I still haven’t understood why there isn’t a joint EEZ between Greece and Cyprus. That’s the easiest solution, and I don’t understand why it hasn’t happened yet. That’s probably down to Turkey’s reaction, with Greece stepping back in a logic of avoiding tension and conflict? But that’s the wrong strategy. Those are tactical moves, not strategy. I remember in 2020, when I was still an active-duty officer serving at the Pentagon, during that tense period in the summer of ’20, every assessment, every scenario, concluded that the Greeks would back down. And that’s the mistake. Greece needs to understand — and Cyprus by extension — that they shouldn’t be taken for granted. If something happens, there has to be a response. I was in Qatar when Turkey shot down the Russian Sukhoi that had entered its airspace for five seconds. In the Aegean, I don’t know how many thousands of violations of Greek airspace have taken place, and nothing happened. Interceptions have occurred. But the other side needs to understand that when you step into my house, you’ll get the response you deserve. If something similar had been done by Greece back then, Turkey would view things differently today. Turkey knows that in the Aegean it faces well-equipped armed forces. Greece is neither Iraq nor Syria. That’s the deterrence doctrine that needs upgrading. But there’s also a view that this deterrence doctrine works against peace and development… On the contrary — has the appeasement doctrine we’re currently living under borne fruit? To pursue the peace we all want, you need very strong deterrent capability. Otherwise it simply doesn’t work. The absence of such a strategy offers windows of opportunity to the adversary. And under current conditions, when you’re confronted with a Turkey pursuing the strategy of Neo-Turkish autonomy, you need to understand exactly who you’re up against. That’s the message I try to convey in America too. Take Trump, who says Erdoğan is his friend and wants to help Turkey and so on — but he doesn’t see that Turkey maintains an occupying army in a European Union member state. Turkey is the only country that threatens casus belli not because it’s under threat, but because another country, Greece, wants to exercise its sovereign rights. Trump sees Turkey as a major country that helps him in the Middle East, with Iran, with the Chinese, with the Russians, and which has the largest army within NATO. It knows it’s a global player How will Trump help Erdoğan? The first move he could make concerns the engines Turkey wants for producing its own fighter jets, the Kaan. We’re talking about a deal worth around $700 million for the engines. That doesn’t require Congressional approval. But he’s also considering bringing Turkey back into the F-35 programme. That’s legally prohibited because Turkey purchased the S-400 missile systems from Russia. But Trump has already said that lifting sanctions against Turkey and its return to the American fighter jet programme is under consideration. I don’t know how that would happen, because there’s strong pushback within Congress. So where does Turkey stand today? My own conclusion is that Turkey is a global player. The Turks know it. What America and the West don’t fully grasp is that through his policies, Erdoğan has effectively replaced the traditional role once held by Saudi Arabia. He wants to become the defender of political Islam. That’s what he’s doing. He has completely overturned Kemal’s original vision of a secular Turkey. That no longer exists. So we’re watching the leader of a NATO member state applaud terrorists, roll out the red carpet for them, welcome them at the Presidential Palace, and declare that Hamas isn’t a terrorist organisation but a liberation movement. Unacceptable statements. The West needs to understand this in order to properly read the problems that exist. Without grasping these facts, unfortunately, unpleasant surprises will keep coming, because we insist on viewing the world through the wrong lens. With this Turkey, how can Cyprus find common ground and resolve the Cyprus problem? With today’s Turkey, resolving the Cyprus problem is perhaps far more difficult and complex than it was in the past — if it was ever easy, which it wasn’t. In any case, the solution needs to be grounded in international law, which remains the established position of many. Turkey will insist on a two-state solution — that’s its line, and I don’t see that position changing in future. Iran’s real nuclear weapon is geography What’s your assessment of how the situation in the region is developing, with one war following another, agreements being announced and then falling apart? Obviously we’re referring to the war with Iran, where developments are moving fast right now and the situation is very fluid. I’d say we currently have this temporary ceasefire, and we don’t know where this story will end up. Starting from America’s position, we want to reach a more comprehensive agreement to secure free access through the Strait of Hormuz. That’s the first and primary issue — opening the strait — and then there’s the nuclear programme, which is an issue that could be shelved and revisited in six months or a year. We’re hearing conflicting messages from Washington too, because the original reason Trump gave for starting this was supposedly to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear programme. But the Iranians have revealed that their real nuclear weapon is geography. It was the closure of the strait. And right now we can see that the ideology of the Iranian regime is exactly what makes it more resilient, what makes the regime itself more resilient — which is why it will remain in power. Was there a miscalculation? Was the adversary seen as vulnerable, with an expectation the regime would fall? Was the Iranian people not ready for a revolution? I’d agree in part. My impression is that after the highly successful operation in Venezuela — a surgical operation that “decapitated” Maduro — I think some in Washington, and perhaps in Israel too, believed that if they struck and eliminated Khamenei and his closest associates, the regime would fall. I think that’s how they calculated it. But they’d forgotten that ideological regimes, like the one we’re dealing with in Tehran, don’t fall that easily. They have a certain resilience, because there’s a network binding the people, the elites and the institutions within the country. There’s also a tendency in the West, and within America, that says: “If we bomb some strategic targets and decapitate the regime’s leadership, it will fall.” But in this case, it didn’t. So other things were expected to happen that didn’t. Also, during the winter and spring when around 30,000 protesters were killed in Tehran, they were banking on some kind of internal reaction, on the people rising up. Clausewitz said that a leader and a general must understand very clearly the kind of war they are about to start. And I don’t think that was observed in Iran’s case. They thought bombing would coerce the regime into collapse, but that didn’t happen. Now they’re trying to pick up the pieces somewhat. Was Washington really dragged in by Israel? I find it hard to believe that Trump was dragged into a war by the Israelis. That sounds a bit like a conspiracy theory to me. I think there was a miscalculation regarding the regime’s likely reaction. My book is about the revenge of ideology, and I think that’s exactly what we’re witnessing with Iran. The old regime has effectively been replaced — Khamenei and his associates were killed — and the reins of the country have been taken up by the Revolutionary Guards, the regime’s most hardline element. All of them used to accuse Khamenei of not responding as forcefully as he should have last year, in the summer of ’25, when the bombings took place. They disagreed with his tactics. And now they’re seeing that their own strategy — striking neighbouring countries, targeting Israel, closing the strait — has produced very good results for them, even though they too are suffering. Inflation in Iran currently stands at around 113%. They don’t factor in what their own people are suffering, because their targets lie elsewhere. America needs to understand it’s dealing with a deeply ideological regime. That ideology is deeply rooted in Iranian society. There’s also a segment of the population that dislikes the regime, but the West shouldn’t underestimate Iranian nationalism either. It’s one thing to say I don’t like what the mullahs are doing, and another to watch bombs falling over your head and destroying your country. Israel is causing unease What about Israel? It’s all connected — there’ll be elections in autumn, and Netanyahu needs his most right-wing supporters. Trump wants to keep him in check so he doesn’t make irresponsible moves in Lebanon. Regardless of the outcome on the ground, has Israel lost morally, given the hostility visible everywhere in the world? I observe this in America too, particularly among the younger generation — today’s twenty-somethings, in every poll, express strong dissatisfaction with Israel’s policy. And that’s unprecedented, especially in America, where support for Israel has traditionally always been strong. At first, everyone said Israel had every right to defend itself, that a response was necessary, that it had to try to eliminate Hamas. But the way the whole matter has been handled, especially with the numerous attacks against civilians in various places, has gone too far. 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