The Mecca Agreement is not a regional NATO, but it is not to be underestimated

Op-eds Middle East The Mecca Agreement is not a regional NATO, but it is not to be underestimated Img 7871 Relevant News The Mecca Agreement is not a regional NATO, but it is not to be underestimated 24 August 2026 Who Is the “Second Israel”? The Kurds — or Turkey? 24 August 2026 How Cyprus funds its parties, and what 2026 exposed 24 August 2026 Newsroom 24 August 2026 FacebookXWhatsAppEmailPrintViber This news piece was first published on policypress.cy By Yiannos Stratis The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement was signed on 7 August between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey, aimed at strengthening deterrence and security in the Middle East. Crucially, the agreement provisions a NATO-like mutual defence clause, whereby ‘any armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all.’ Generally, it is intended to promote the ‘enhancement of all aspects of defence cooperation.’ This alliance builds on a previously signed agreement of similar character between Riyadh and Islamabad in September 2025, the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA). Understanding it requires examining its raison d’être, its particular characteristics, its impacts and its viability. Why now? The need for regional security architectures such as Mecca and SMDA arose from the growing instability in the Middle East. The risks of the US-Israel-Iran geopolitical antagonism have grown beyond causing instability in key regions such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. Regional conflict has been steadily threatening the territories and vessels of several Middle Eastern states; in the June 2025 12-day war, Iran claims to have attacked US military targets in Qatar and Iraq, while since 28 February, Iran has also hit Gulf states’ vessels and civilian targets. While the US has deep defence ties with many regional actors, it is being demonstrated to them that such cooperation is not the end-all-be-all of their national security. What does each stakeholder have to gain from it? For Saudi Arabia, the US-angle has been critical in signing this agreement. The Iran war has threatened stability in economically crucial trade routes in the Red Sea and Hormuz as much as it has threatened Saudi vessels, and even Saudi territorial integrity. The US has not only not safeguarded Riyadh’s regional interests, but it has escalated the conflict. That having been said, there is no Saudi intention to abandon the historic and extensive cooperation with Washington. Nevertheless, Mecca simply diversifies Saudi Arabia’s defence partnerships, whilst possibly giving it access to the expertise and technical sophistication of the larger Turkish and Pakistani militaries. Like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan also enjoys defence ties with the US, though on a smaller scale. Significantly deeper defence cooperation is enjoyed with China. In light of this, the agreement poses two main benefits for Islamabad; the first one is that Mecca provides Pakistan with more flexibility in its defence strategy, as its partnership diversification makes foreign policy less dependent on Beijing, whilst providing access to sophisticated Turkish military production. Secondly, Pakistan’s geostrategic value increases, as it has gone from a South Asian military power with defence ties to Gulf states, to a possible security provider in the broader Middle East. The extent to which the latter is probable remains to be seen, but the door is now open for such a development. Turkey also has much to gain from Mecca. Ankara is set to take advantage of the wide Saudi defence market with its booming industry, while jointly manufactured defence projects are also a possibility. Crucially, the move also increases Turkey’s strategic autonomy, as its NATO membership coupled with this intensified military role in the Muslim world emphasises its geostrategic value as a security provider in both the European and Middle Eastern fronts. As is evident therefore, the agreement emerges less as an alliance against one common threat, and more as a mutually beneficial alliance based on each stakeholder’s visions and concerns regarding security. What does Mecca entail? Is it an ‘Islamic NATO’? It is important to examine exactly what the agreement entails, especially in light of the media’s habit of calling it an ‘Islamic NATO.’ Seeing as Mecca has been a very recent development, its functionality could be further understood through the older agreement on which it is based; the September 2025 SMDA signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The exact content was never published, though Saudi media tended to emphasise its defence cooperation provisions and the mutual defence clause. A significant question is whether the SMDA, and thus that of Mecca, stipulated a shared nuclear umbrella. Upon signing the SMDA, the Pakistani defence minister initially announced that his country’s nuclear programme ‘will be made available’ to Saudi Arabia, though he later backtracked on the statement. As such, the agreement likely contained no provisions regarding nuclear-related assistance, and mostly involved mutual defence. It is doubtful therefore whether Mecca provisions extensive nuclear cooperation between the allies. This is made even more clear considering how newcomer Turkey not only enjoys nuclear deterrence through NATO, but the range of Pakistan’s nuclear missiles falls too short to strike Turkey’s regional rivals, claims a Chatham House report. It is significant to additionally understand how this agreement worked in practice, when Saudi Arabian vessels and infrastructure faced strikes on multiple occasions by Iran and its proxies since February 2026. Although Riyadh never publicly called for the activation of the mutual defence clause, Islamabad presented an image of solidarity by A) Strongly condemning Iran’s actions, B) Sending 8,000 Pakistani troops and a jet squadron to Saudi Arabia in May 2026 and C) Mediating direct talks between Washington and Tehran aimed at ending the war. The SMDA was therefore primarily characterised by its mutual defence clause and a general duty to solidarity. Ankara’s inclusion into such an agreement can imply a plethora of things, and particularly given its booming defence industry, it can be assumed that its membership in the agreement paves the way for Turkish arms exports to Islamabad and Riyadh and joint arms production projects between the three allies. As such, the trilateral agreement can be described as a vague but broad one that provisions mutual defence, with a history of active solidarity among its members (without this necessarily meaning members going to war for one another), no indication of member-wide nuclear cooperation, and strong implications of defence industry ties. Does this then satisfy the criteria of an ‘Islamic NATO’? The Turkish foreign minister, Hakan Fidan has explicitly compared Mecca’s mutual defence clause to that of NATO’s, possibly indicating political will on Ankara’s part to equate the two alliances. He has indicated that Mecca will have a common Secretariat, a ‘political and military committee’ consisting of each member’s foreign ministers and chiefs of general staff, and promote military interoperability. Even so, and even accounting for the different scales between the two alliances, their structural and institutional differences make it difficult to characterise Mecca as NATOist. Other than mutual defence, and NATO’s military committee which that of Mecca may mimic, NATO also provisions the operation of three main decision-making bodies; the North-Atlantic Council (NAC) which meets weekly to discuss NATO strategy, the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) which meets biannually to (among other things) ensure common military capability and standard, and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) which meets to discuss nuclear strategy. NATO’s military operations are also facilitated by military bodies, hierarchies, and active high-ranking army officers, that do not strictly belong to members’ national armies. While the two alliances do share certain characteristics, there is little evidence that Mecca’s seemingly thinner institutions mimic NATO’s frequent meetings, its insistence on common military capability (which does not necessarily equate with interoperability), and its integrated military structure. If Mecca does provision for such mechanisms, it has not been made publicly known. Meanwhile, there is also reason to doubt that nuclear discussions among the three are on the table. While it is true that even NATO itself lacked such an intricate political and military structure when it was first created, it cannot be claimed confidently that its institutions today match those announced regarding Mecca. Therefore, any comparisons with NATO are at best premature, pending more public information on the agreement or further developments. On top of this, one could doubt Mecca’s ability to expand at the same level as NATO has throughout its history. Regional Muslim states simply have different views on security; some such as the UAE, Egypt or Bahrain view Iran as a threat and prioritise stable relations with Israel, while others such as Iraq or Kuwait might have the opposite view. If Mecca expands to include all such states, and a member falls victim to either an Iranian or Israeli strike, will there exist the political will to activate the mutual defence clause? If not, the alliance might lack credibility and sustainability. There also exist other contradictions among foreign policy views, as Riyadh allegedly opposed the Turkish bid to include Egypt into the agreement, given Saudi doubts of Cairo’s reliability as a security partner. As such, under current circumstances in the Muslim world, Mecca lacks the possibility of reaching NATO’s scale and unity. How does it affect the balance of power in the region? While this alliance currently does not mimic a regional NATO, it is not to be dismissed as insignificant. It is an agreement that produces changes in the balance of power in the Middle East. While Mecca does not replace the massive influence of the US in the Gulf when it comes to defence, it could allow for somewhat more autonomous decision-making in the region led by Ankara, Riyadh and Islamabad, that might not always align with Washington’s interests. That having been said, given Mecca’s limited participation, and the difficulty of unanimous action in case of wider participation, the alliance’s ability to independently exert regional influence is limited. Mecca also shifts balances regarding its individual members. Most notably, Pakistan and Turkey with their large military capacity expand their geostrategic roles as regional security providers. Through this, they gain more flexible strategic manoeuvring with their partners, those of Ankara in the Euro-Atlantic and those of Islamabad in Asia. Through the increased potential for Turkey-led defence exports and joint production projects, Ankara can foster long-term defence ties for technical and maintenance reasons with Riyadh and Islamabad. Increased ties with Riyadh might also give Turkey leverage to influence the Saudi-related geopolitical developments that ignore Ankara’s interests, such as the planned IMEEC trade route that currently excludes Turkish routes. All the while, Saudi Arabia becomes a more strategically autonomous player in the Middle East, potentially gaining an amount of flexibility from US strategic alignment, and opens the door for further acquisitions of Turkey’s defence equipment and military know-how. Is the alliance viable or has it already failed? It is natural to question the success of the deal, given the lacklustre response to the Houthi attack on a Saudi oil refinery on 9 August, just two days after the signing of the agreement. Although the defence clause was not called on by Riyadh, Islamabad and Ankara have seemingly not responded at all. This reveals possible complications regarding the deal; what actions constitute an ‘attack’, the exact process for how to plan the alliance’s response, and whether attacks can also emerge from non-state actors are not known to the public. It could also be the case that there is more political will for deterrence rather than for engagement in warfare. Another possibility is that solidarity is taking place in the form of intelligence sharing and other non-visible methods. Overall, it is not clear whether Pakistan and Turkey are currently planning to respond to the attacks, however it is probable that the alliance will exponentially lose credibility if more attacks of this kind are tolerated with impunity. So, what is the Mecca agreement? In its essence, the Mecca agreement is a tripartite alliance that provisions collaboration across vast sectors of defence. Its most striking feature is the mutual defence clause, though it opens the possibility for joint arms production, intelligence-sharing, expertise-sharing and other cooperative actions among the three allies. That having been said, the possibility of nuclear collaboration is currently premature. It signals a slight power shift from the US to the members in the Middle East, though Washington’s influence in the region persists. It also generally boosts the geostrategic value of each state in different ways. Finally, one must be cautious about oversimplifying the alliance. It is not, and under current circumstances cannot be a united NATO-like bloc, due to its uncertain or smaller-sized institutional structure and lack of unifying security perceptions. It is also not an insignificant alliance, as it boosts each member geostrategically and signals greater autonomy among certain Middle Eastern countries. Subscribe to our Newsletter Latest News Who Is the “Second Israel”? The Kurds — or Turkey? How Cyprus funds its parties, and what 2026 exposed What If Mark Zuckerberg Is Right? Road deaths reach 26 in Cyprus this year, more than half motorcyclists Larnaca DLGO mourns employee killed in motorcycle crash, post-mortem confirms cause of death Latchi is changing – my thought of the day National Guard to design and build small drones through new lab Follow en.philenews on Google News and be the first to know all the news about Cyprus and the world.