There are solutions to all Cyprob sticking points

Issues of the minority must be resolved without creating issues for the majoritySince 1963, Cyprus has been in an anomalous political situation, while since 1974, one-third of the island has been under the occupation of neighbouring Turkey. Greek Cypriot politicians whine and indulge in wishful thinking, consolidating and perpetuating this anomalous state of affairs as if they were on a mission ordered by Turkey. Given the convergences achieved at Crans-Montana, the core of the problem lies with the Turkish Cypriot minority, which (justifiably) refuses to accept that its members are second-class citizens and demands reasonable assurances that their physical existence will not be threatened, as occurred in the past. In practice, the issues blocking the resolution of the Cyprus problem are the “rotating presidency”, the “at least one positive vote” and the securing of the physical safety of the minority’s members. In my opinion, these are the three thorns preventing an immediate solution to the Cyprus issue, and they require a regulation that resolves the minority’s problems without creating problems for the majority. Greek Cypriots justifiably fear that a “rotating presidency” will create serious problems for the smooth functioning of the Cypriot state, because a smooth alternation in the presidency will be impossible, and the necessary consistency in the country’s governance will be lacking – for instance, if the Greek Cypriot president is far-left and the Turkish Cypriot president is far-right, or vice versa. Both Cypriot communities justifiably fear that the elected presidents of each side will be dedicated to serving the interests (both well-intentioned and ill-intentioned) of their respective sides. This was precisely the reason behind the collapse of the state created in 1960 under the Zurich-London Agreements. The obvious, simple solution to this problem is electing the rotating presidents based on a “kindred” political platform characterised by common goals and shared policies. Participation in the electoral process might not (necessarily) require the existence of a “kindred” political platform, but weighted votes should be calculated across the entire territory, thereby granting a comparative advantage to politically moderate candidates and excluding extreme elements from the political processes of the federal, bicommunal, bi-zonal Cypriot state. Under the conditions described above, securing “one positive vote” will be easy and “natural,” especially considering that approximately 75 per cent of Cyprus’ legislation (as a European Union member) originates from Brussels. The necessity of “one positive vote” will act as a safety valve for both communities; meaning one community will not be able to do something that adversely affects the other (for example, in the area of the environment or that of the economy). In fact, the remaining 25 per cent of legislation could well take the form of secondary legislation, bounded by primary law and shaped through “presidential decrees” in each of the constituent states. This would make the existence of several legislative parliaments in a Lilliputian state like Cyprus unnecessary, while also preventing legislative bodies from becoming havens for extreme nationalist elements. Finally, the “one positive vote” for both sides will ensure that Turkey and Greece are barred from dictating legislative regulations (to their respective constituent states) that serve interests alien to Cyprus. The third major problem is ensuring the physical integrity and security of all Cypriots, which is a serious concern for both sides. This objective can easily be achieved by stationing the European Army in Cyprus at the Dhekelia and Agios Nikolaos bases that are currently utilised by the United Kingdom but could be permanently ceded to the European Union. This army would naturally include the soldiers permanently serving in the National Guard, a corresponding number of Turkish Cypriot soldiers, 950 Greek soldiers, and, under a special arrangement, 650 Turkish soldiers, as well as a number of British soldiers. Such an arrangement would make everyone happy and, most importantly, during a period of instability and uncertainty in the wider region of Cyprus, the presence of a European Army would foster a sense of internal and external security. I consider any talk about “demilitarising” Cyprus to be naive and dangerous, because demilitarisation would leave Cyprus highly vulnerable to any foreign design. I also consider the slogan “zero troops, zero guarantees” naive. Truly, are there people who believe that a militarily powerful country needs “guarantees” to invade another country, if it decides to do so? The examples of such invasions in world history are numerous. Finally, I come to the issue of “confidence-building measures”. Practice has proven that, with the exception of preserving cultural heritage monuments, it is nearly impossible to agree upon and implement substantive confidence-building measures, simply because of the fear that they will create new faits accomplis and will perpetuate the division of Cyprus. In contrast, on reaching a comprehensive agreement, it will be very easy to implement a series of measures that will assist in the proper application of what has been agreed. For example, restoring the place names of 1960, with each constituent state having the option to add a new place name to the area it administers, would be an excellent confidence-building measure. Another would be the re-adoption of Greek, Turkish and English as the official languages of Cyprus (Switzerland has more than three official languages). With the advancement of artificial intelligence in the field of translation, adopting three official languages is easy, fast and relatively inexpensive, for both written and spoken language. Lawyers often make the mistake of believing that the most important factor in successfully achieving a political goal is drafting a good law. Practice refutes this narrative in a spectacular fashion. The success or failure of such an endeavour primarily depends on the abilities, flexibility and good faith of those who implement the legislation. Therefore, the successful resolution of the Cyprus problem depends on involving (at the implementation stage) people who have these qualities. A final word for those who claim they cannot accept the abandonment of the idea of “Enosis”. When there are common laws, a common currency and common monetary policies, common taxation (VAT), common standards, unrestricted cross-border movement of people, goods and services, freedom of establishment and work, mutual recognition of qualifications, and a largely common cultural heritage, has Enosis not already been attained? Furthermore, it has been attained in a way that is perfectly acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots – though it is something many Greek Cypriots have not yet realised.